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Pivnick, Chuck Poche, David Pratt and Steven Woods in the review of
cases and drafting portions of this article.
I. MORTGAGES AND FORECLOSURES
N Hance, Scarborough, Wright, Ginsberg & Brusilow, L.L.P. v. Kin-
caid,' the court faced the task of distributing foreclosure proceeds
among numerous payees of a note. The Callisons executed a
$308,240 promissory note payable to Quanah Hospitality Inns, Inc.
("QHI"), secured by a deed of trust. At the same time, the Callisons sold
the property to the Wrights, who in turn executed a $373,510 "wrap-
around" promissory note. The note designated the Callisons and Kincaid
as payees and was secured by a deed of trust subordinate to the vendor's
lien and deed of trust executed by the Callisons in favor of QHI. Several
years later, the Wrights defaulted on the note, and the Callisons and Kin-
caid foreclosed on the subordinate "wrap" deed of trust. Shortly thereaf-
ter, the Callisons defaulted on the senior note to QHI, and QHI
foreclosed upon the property under the senior deed of trust. After the
foreclosure, sale proceeds were credited against the outstanding balance
of Callisons' senior note, a surplus of $53,555.64 remained. The payees of
the Wright "wrap" note demanded the excess sale proceeds, but the trial
court awarded the full amount to Kincaid.
The Callisons appealed, asserting that Kincaid's interest in the funds
was limited to his proportionate interest in the Wrights' "wrap" note, cit-
ing the relevant language in the note that "Kincaid is entitled to the pro-
portionate payment from the proceeds of this note herein, to the said
extent of $63,099.47."'2 Kincaid countered, contending that the language
entitled him to the full $63,099.47 under the note. The court disagreed,
interpreting the provision to grant Kincaid a 16.893% total ownership in-
terest in the note.3 Since Kincaid maintained a 16.893% interest in the
note itself, he was only entitled to 16.893% of the excess proceeds of the
note.
In Oles v. Curl,4 Oles executed a promissory note and deed of trust in
favor of the Curls. When Oles defaulted, the Curls foreclosed on the
deed of trust. Unbeknownst to the Curls, Oles filed for bankruptcy on
the day prior to the foreclosure sale. In response, Oles filed suit, pro-
testing that the foreclosure sale violated the automatic stay triggered by
the bankruptcy filing. Filing a petition in bankruptcy imposes a stay,
preventing actions from being taken against the bankruptcy estate, in-
1. Hance, Scarborough, Wright, Ginsberg & Brusilow, L.L.P. v. Kincaid, 70 S.W.3d
907 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. denied).
2. Id. at 909.
3. The court reached this number by dividing the maximum amount of Kincaid's in-
terest in the note ($63,099.47) by the total amount of the note ($373,510.00).
4. Oles v. Curl, 65 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.).
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cluding actions taken by creditors that create or enforce liens against
property of the bankruptcy estate.5 The court recognized that actions
that violate the stay are void, regardless of whether a party has notice of
the filing. Section 549(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, however, offers pro-
tection for good faith purchasers of real property if: (a) the purchaser did
not have knowledge of the bankruptcy, (b) paid fair market value for the
property, and (c) a notice of the petition was not filed in the real property
records before the property was purchased. 6 The court precluded any
argument that the Curls were good faith purchasers, having failed to in-
troduce evidence that they lacked knowledge of the bankruptcy filing.
Allied Capital Corporation v. Cravens7 confronted the issue of whether
overzealous advertising for a foreclosure sale amounted to tortious inter-
ference with a contract. The Palmers executed two promissory notes se-
cured by deeds of trust in favor of Allied Capital Corporation. Upon the
maturity of the notes, the Palmers failed to make timely payments and
Allied posted the properties for foreclosure. Subsequently, the parties
entered into a rule 11 agreement whereby Allied agreed to postpone the
foreclosure sale until October, provided the Palmers paid $245,000 by
September 15. But by September 8, Allied had started advertising the
foreclosure sale. Cravens filed a motion for a temporary injunction of the
foreclosure sale, professing an ownership interest in a portion of the
property. Cravens alleged that Allied's advertisement of the sale consti-
tuted tortious interference with a contract, in that the advertisement de-
terred potential purchasers of the property.
The court discussed the elements that must be proven to prevail on a
claim of tortuous interference with prospective business relations: (a) a
reasonable probability that the parties would have entered into a contrac-
tual relationship; (b) an independently tortious or unlawful act by the
defendant that intervened with the formation of that relationship; (c) the
defendants acted with a desire to prevent the relationship from occurring;
and (d) actual damage, loss or harm suffered by the plaintiff, resulting
from the defendant's interference.8 In analyzing whether Allied's behav-
ior in advertising the foreclosure sale constituted a tort, the court re-
viewed the statutory requirements for notice of a foreclosure sale under
the Texas Property Code. According to Section 51.002 thereof, written
notice must be given at least twenty-one days in advance and must be
posted at the courthouse door in each county where the property is lo-
cated, filed with the county clerk of those counties and sent to each
debtor by certified mail.9 The court determined, however, that these were
the minimum standards required by law. Although Allied's advertise-
5. 11 U.S.C. § 362, 362(a)(4) (2000).
6. Id. § 549(c).
7. Allied Capital Corp. v. Cravens, 67 S.W.3d 486 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002,
no pet.).
8. Id. at 491.
9. TEX. PROP. CooE ANN. § 51.002(b) (Vernon 1995).
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ment of the foreclosure sale exceeded the minimum legal requirements,
its actions did not comprise a tort.
In the case of Kaplan v. Tiffany Development Corporation,10 Tiffany
Development Corporation signed a promissory note evidencing a
$220,000 loan from Kaplan, secured by real property. When Tiffany de-
faulted on its payment obligations, Kaplan posted the property for fore-
closure sale. On the day prior to the sale, Tiffany sought a temporary
restraining order to prevent Kaplan from conducting the sale, contending
that the promissory note was usurious. The court granted the temporary
restraining order, conditioned on Tiffany posting a $30,000 bond with the
court. When Tiffany failed to post the bond, Kaplan conducted the fore-
closure sale. Tiffany then filed a Motion to Void the Foreclosure Sale and
for Issuance of Writ of Temporary Injunction. When the trial court
voided the sale, Kaplan appealed.
To obtain a temporary injunction, a petitioner must prove three ele-
ments: (a) a cause of action against the defendant; (b) a probable right to
the relief sought; and (c) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in
the interim.1 Kaplan challenged Tiffany's assertion that it had a proba-
ble right to the relief sought. In discussing whether Tiffany could support
an allegation of usury, the court determined that one must show that the
creditor loaned money to the debtor who had an absolute obligation to
repay the principal and that the interest charged, contracted for, or re-
ceived by the creditor exceeded the maximum amount allowed under law.
Tiffany proved that the interest rate under the note amounted to 37.54%
and when modified totaled 45.88%.12 In response, Kaplan argued that a
savings clause in the original note precluded Kaplan from charging inter-
est at an usurious rate. The court followed a long line of decisions hold-
ing that a savings clause will not prevent a contract from being usurious if
the contract is usurious by its terms. Finding that the original note and
modified note were usurious, the court upheld the trial court's issuance of
a temporary injunction.
Hoffman, McBryde & Co., P.C. v. Heyland13 addressed the issue of
whether an abstract of judgment must show the balance due on the date
the abstract was issued by the court or on the date the abstract was filed.
According to the facts of the case, Hoffman, McBryde & Co., P.C.
("HMCo") and the Patricks entered into a judgment in a separate law-
suit. An abstract of judgment was issued in 1992, indicating that the Pa-
tricks still owed $13,000 to HMCo. HMCo, however, did not file the
abstract for several years. In the interim, the Patricks paid the remaining
balance down to $6,000. HMCo then filed the original abstract. The Pa-
tricks sold property to the Heylands and when the proceeds of the sale
10. Kaplan v. Tiffany Dev. Corp., 69 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no
pet.).
11. Id. at 218.
12. Id. At the time, the maximum interest rate under Texas law was 18%.




were not enough to satisfy the outstanding balance owed to HMCo.
HMCo brought suit against Heyland for a declaratory judgment and to
foreclose against the property. Heyland filed a motion for summary judg-
ment, alleging that since the abstract of judgment did not reflect the cred-
its the Patricks had paid against the original $13,000 due, the abstract
failed to comply with the requirements of the Texas Property Code,
which requires an abstract of judgment to show "the amount for which
the judgment was rendered and the balance due.' 4 When the trial court
granted Heyland's motion for summary judgment, HMCo appealed.
After concluding that the abstract of judgment was correct when it was
issued and that it was recorded and indexed correctly, the court deliber-
ated whether the abstract was void because it failed to reflect payments
against the outstanding indebtedness prior to filing. Section 52 of the
Texas Property Code imposes no such requirement, 15 and the court re-
fused to imply a responsibility on the part of the judgment creditor to
amend the indebtedness listed on the abstract, explaining that such a re-
quirement would be burdensome. 16 The court acknowledged that its de-
cision contradicted a number of earlier cases that utilized the "stand-
alone" test in its analysis. Under this approach, one should be able to
determine the correct amount of the judgment from the abstract of judg-
ment alone. The court rejected this evaluation, responding that the
stand-alone test assumes the missing information is required by statute,
while section 52 of the Texas Property Code is silent as to whether the
amount of credits is required as of the date the abstract of judgment is
recorded. 17
A number of cases during this survey year involved foreclosures insti-
tuted by homeowner associations. Cottonwood Valley Home Owners As-
sociation v. Hudson'8 addressed the issue of whether a trial court has the
right to deny the foreclosure of a lien, and whether a mandatory home-
owners' association is entitled to foreclose on a recorded lien securing a
payment obligation for homeowners' assessments. Cottonwood Valley
Home Owners Association sued Hudson to collect outstanding home-
owners' assessments. Cottonwood had previously sent Hudson notices
for payment of the assessments, and when Hudson failed to pay, Cotton-
wood filed a notice of lien against Hudson's property. The trial court
rendered judgment in favor of Cottonwood but refused to grant Cotton-
wood's request for foreclosure of Hudson's property. Cottonwood ap-
pealed, claiming they had a right of foreclosure.
The court looked to Inwood North Homeowners' Association v. Har-
ris,19 to determine whether Cottonwood was entitled to foreclose for fail-
14. Id. at 908. See also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.003(a)(6) (Vernon 1995).
15. Heyland, 74 S.W.3d at 910.
16. Id. at 911.
17. Id. at 913.
18. Cottonwood Valley Home Owners Ass'n v. Hudson, 75 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. App.-
Eastland 2002, no pet.).
19. Inwood N. Homeowners' Ass'n v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1987).
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ure to pay assessments. In Inwood, the court recognized that courts must
enforce homeowner assessment agreements, and a homeowners' associa-
tion has the right to foreclose for nonpayment of assessments.20 Apply-
ing this rationale, the court ruled that the trial court abused its discretion
by refusing to grant Cottonwood's request for judicial foreclosure. As
such, the court modified the trial court's order and entered an order for a
judicial foreclosure against Hudson.
Similarly, a condominium owners' association foreclosed on several
units for failure to pay maintenance fees in Aghili v. Banks.2' The Texas
Uniform Condominium Act recognizes that the recordation of a condo-
minium declaration creates a perpetual lien on a condominium to secure
payment of such fees.22 Unless the declaration provides otherwise, no
further recording of the lien is necessary for purposes of notice and
perfection. 23 Aghili attempted to void the foreclosure sale, maintaining
that the particular condominium declaration in question required addi-
tional recording of a notice of lien, which the owner's association failed to
file. An analysis of the declaration disclosed that further recordation was
optional at the discretion of the owners' association and the declaration
expressly stated that the lien could be enforced "by all methods available
for the enforcement of such liens. "24
In Nipper-Bertram Trust v. Aldine Independent School District,25 Oscar
Nipper and Nipper-Bertram Trust failed to pay ad valorem taxes on two
lots. Aldine Independent School District brought suit and was awarded
judgments in personam and in rem for foreclosing the tax liens on the
properties. Lot 6 was purchased by a third party, resulting in a surplus of
funds, while the sale of Lot 7 failed to attract bidders and was sold to
Aldine for the minimum bid. In the interim, taxes became due on both
properties. Aldine filed a motion to recover the excess funds to offset the
deficiency on Lot 7. When the trial court awarded the excess funds to
Aldine, Nipper-Bertram appealed, contending that the trial court erred
by allowing Aldine to apply the excess funds from Lot 6 to satisfy the
deficiency on Lot 7.
The court first examined whether the excess proceeds could be used to
pay outstanding post-judgment taxes, interest and penalties owing on
Lot 6. An inspection of Section 34.04 of the Tax Code26 revealed that
Aldine was clearly entitled to use the excess funds for payment of post-
judgment amounts due on Lot 6.27 The court then reviewed Section
34.04(c)(4) of the Tax Code to decide whether the excess proceeds from
20. Id. at 636.
21. Aghili v. Banks, 63 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet.
denied).
22. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 82.113(a) (Vernon 1995).
23. Aghili, 63 S.W.3d at 816.
24. Id. at 817.
25. Nipper-Bertram Trust v. Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist., 76 S.W.3d 788 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).
26. TEX. TAX CoDE ANN. § 34.04(c)(4) (Vernon 2002).
27. Nipper-Bertram, 76 S.W.3d at 792.
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Lot 6 could be credited against the deficiency on Lot 7. Scrutinizing the
provision from Section 34.04(c)(4) that "the court shall order that the
proceeds be paid according to the following priorities ... to a taxing unit
for any unpaid taxes, penalties, interest, or other amounts adjudged due
under the judgment that were not satisfied from the proceeds from the
tax sale . . .," the court focused on the language "amounts adjudged due
under the judgement. '28 Determining there was only one judgment in
rem that authorized the sales of Lot 6 and Lot 7, the court held that the
sale proceeds could be allocated between the two properties as Aldine
chose.
The sufficiency of evidence of the fair market value of property under
the Texas Anti-Deficiency Statute29 was addressed in Lairsen v. Slutzky. 30
The debtor, Lairsen, asserted his right to offset under the anti-deficiency
statute, which the creditor, The Longitudinal Trust, claimed was not ap-
propriately proved at trial. This statute allows several methods for deter-
mining the fair market value of the property, including "expert opinion
testimony, comparable sales, anticipated marketing time and holding
costs, cost of sale, and the necessity and amount of any discount to be
applied to the future sales price or the cash flow generated by the prop-
erty. ''31 Lairsen's evidence included testimony of a local real estate agent
regarding prior purchase offers for the subject property which were re-
ceived by the then owner and current creditor. The court concluded that
such evidence was competent evidence and legally sufficient to establish
the fair market value of the property. In this case, the real estate agent
testified that she had at least four years of experience in the subject area,
familiarity with the subject property, prior sales of property across the
street within a year of the default, sales of property adjacent to the sub-
ject property within three years, and a sale of a property one-half block
away subsequent to the default and prior to the time of testimony. An-
other real estate agent and investor testified about the value of the prop-
erty and his qualifications, including thirty-five years as a real estate
investor in the county, an investigation of the subject property for an in-
vestor group, the offer made for such property, and his opinion of the fair
market value. The court held that such evidence, together with the evi-
dence of the purchase money creditor of prior offers, was sufficient to
support the jury's finding of the fair market value of the property.
II. PROMISSORY NOTES, LOAN COMMITMENTS,
AND LOAN AGREEMENTS
Fein v R.P.H., Inc. 32 presented a situation in which the holder of a non-
28. Id.
29. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003(b) (Vernon 1995).
30. Lairsen v. Slutzky, 80 S.W.3d 121 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied). This case
is discussed more fully in section IV hereof.
31. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003(b) (Vernon 1995).




recourse promissory note sought to collect on the collateral securing the
note only to find the collateral had been converted into other assets of
the debtor. In 1994, Fein executed a $125,000 promissory note in favor of
R.P.H., Inc. secured by a five percent interest in Surgical Care Centers of
Texas, L.C. ("Surgicare"). The note provided that Fein would pay the
amount due "without lability [sic], warranty or obligation" and "there is
no personal guaranty of Steven A. Fein, M.D... of this promissory note
or indebtedness. '' 33 In 1995, R.P.H. was negotiating a merger between
Surgicare and Amedisys, Inc. ("Amedisys") that entailed the exchange of
Surgicare stock for Amedisys stock. R.P.H. demanded that Fein dis-
charge the debt under the note. In response to R.P.H.'s request for pay-
ment, Fein replied that he planned to exchange his interest in Surgicare
for 50,000 shares of Amedisys stock, and that he had no intention of pay-
ing off the note. Two years later, R.P.H. made a written demand for Fein
to surrender the Surgicare stock, and when Fein failed to respond, R.P.H.
filed suit. When R.P.H. learned that in the interim Fein had sold his
Amedisys stock for $250,000 R.P.H. amended its petition to include the
recovery of the $250,000. When the trial court awarded R.P.H.
$185,909.90 for Fein's failure to repay the note, Fein appealed.
On appeal, the court of appeals first considered Fein's assertion that
the trial court erred in holding him personally liable under the note be-
cause R.P.H.'s sole remedy was limited to recovery of the collateral. In
response, R.P.H. contended that Fein had failed to waive his personal
liability under the note. The court disagreed, noting that the language of
the note stated twice (as quoted above) that Fein was not personally lia-
ble. The absence of language in the note that R.P.H.'s "sole remedy" was
to resort to the collateral was not compelling.34
R.P.H. argued in the alternative that it was entitled to the proceeds
from the sale of the Amedisys stock. The court overruled this point, ex-
plaining that the Surgicare Stock and the Amedisys stock were not inter-
changeable because a non-recourse note is repayable only from the
proceeds of the sale of the specific collateral securing the note.35 In addi-
tion, R.P.H. had an opportunity to substitute the Amedisys stock as new
collateral under the note when Fein told R.P.H. that he was going to ex-
change his interest in Surgicare for the Amedisys stock. The Amedisys
stock was Fein's personal asset and allowing R.P.H. to recover the
Amedisys proceeds would undermine the note's non-recourse character.
The court in Aguero v. Ramirez36 interpreted the statute of limitations
in connection with the enforcement of remedies on a note secured by a
deed of trust and a vendor's lien. Aguero executed a $36,000 note paya-
ble to Ramirez and secured by a deed of trust and vendor's lien on real
33. Id. at 263.
34. Id. at 267.
35. Id. at 266 (discussing Burns v. Resolution Trust Corp., 880 S.W.2d 149, 153 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ)).




property. In 1994, Aguero failed to pay under the note. In 1999, Rami-
rez sued, seeking to recover principal and interest. The trial court en-
tered judgment in favor of Ramirez, and Aguero appealed. On appeal,
Aguero maintained that Ramirez's claim was barred by the statute of lim-
itations. Section 16.035 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
provides that "[a] person must bring suit for the recovery of real property
under a real property lien or the foreclosure of a real property lien not
later than four years after the day the cause of action accrues. ' 37 The
court did not dispute Aguero's assertion that Ramirez brought legal ac-
tion more than four years after the cause of action originated. The court,
however, disagreed with Aguero's application of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code, distinguishing the circumstances of Ramirez's peti-
tion. When a note is secured by a lien, the note and the lien comprise
separate and distinct obligations. 38 The court determined that since Ra-
mirez brought suit to recover under the note alone and not under the
deed of trust, section 16.035 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code was inapplicable. Instead, the court applied Section 3.118 of the
Texas Business and Commerce Code, which provides that an action to
enforce the payment of a note must be brought within six years after the
amount becomes due. 39 Because only five years had passed since the
cause of action commenced, the court affirmed the trial court's decision.
In Vernor v. Southwest Federal Land Bank Association, FLCA,40 the
Vernors borrowed $130,500 from the Federal Land Bank of Texas, se-
cured by 240 acres of real property. Federal Land Bank then assigned the
note to Southwest Federal Land Bank Association, FLCA. When the
Vernors defaulted on the note and failed to respond to the bank's de-
mand, Southwest accelerated the note and sought a judicial foreclosure of
the property. After the trial court rendered judgment for Southwest, the
Vernors appealed. On appeal, the Vernors argued that Southwest lacked
standing to initiate legal proceedings because the note was non-transfera-
ble. The court dismissed this allegation, observing the language in the
note specifying that "said Bank or the owner or holder of the note" con-
templated the possibility that someone other than Federal Land Bank
could be the holder of the note.41 An analysis of the note revealed that it
did not prohibit assignment. Absent such language, a note is generally
assignable under Texas law.42
In Patel v. Kuciemba,43 the court refused to hold a widow liable for four
promissory notes her husband had executed. The evidence revealed that
the wife was not involved in her husband's business, had no knowledge of
37. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.035(a) (Vernon 2002).
38. Aguero, 70 S.W.3d at 374 (citing Whittington v. Whittington, 853 S.W.2d 193, 195
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ).
39. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.118(a) (Vernon 2002).
40. Vernor v. S.W. Fed. Land Bank Ass'n, 77 S.W.3d 364 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2002, pet. denied).
41. Id. at 366.
42. Id.
43. Patel v. Kuciemba, 82 S.W.3d 589 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied).
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any security for the notes, refused to acknowledge that she was liable for
the outstanding principal and interest, and did not ratify any of the notes.
On a related issue, the court refused to void a sale of collateral property
as a fraudulent transaction where the beneficiaries under a deed of trust
posted the property for a non-judicial foreclosure sale. The grantor sold
the property to a related party immediately prior to the sale and used the
sale proceeds to extinguish the debt, even though the sales price was sub-
stantially below market value.44
III. GUARANTIES
Glazner v. Haase4 5 reminds us of the basics of guaranty contract forma-
tion. In this case, Glazner went to work for Haase, the owner of a
Whataburger franchise in the Longview area. Glazner wanted to own
and operate a Whataburger franchise of his own and worked out a tenta-
tive agreement with Haase. Haase had entered similar agreements
before, whereby Haase would support a franchisee in his application for a
Whataburger franchise. Haase guaranteed the franchisee's success by
agreeing to a reciprocal purchase options upon certain events. There was
no formal documentation entered into between Glazner and Haase.
Glazner was ultimately not granted a franchise, but Haase, sometime
thereafter, did receive a franchise for the south Longview area in which
Glazner was interested. Glazner brought suit, and Haase defended on
the ground that the claims were barred because the contract was unen-
forceable by reason of the Statute of Frauds.4 6 As a basis for establishing
a written contract, Glazner asserted four writings, three of which were
letters signed by Haase or otherwise referred to in letters signed by
Haase, with the fourth being a written cash flow statement. The three
letters expressed the "tentative agreement" that "essentially states" the
arrangement between the parties.47 Glazner alleged that the cash flow
statement reflected Haase's agreement to accept two percent of the net
sales proceeds from the new Whataburger franchise in return for Haase's
relinquishment of rights to this franchise location. In considering the al-
leged guaranty under the Statute of Frauds, the court held it unenforce-
able. As to the cash flow statement, the court noted that it could not be
validated under the Statute of Frauds, since it was not plainly referred to
in any signed document.4 8 As to the three written and signed letters, the
court also concluded these did not satisfy the essential elements of a bind-
ing agreement. First, the court concluded that they were not supported
by sufficient consideration since the cash flow statement could not be
44. See Section V infra.
45. Glazner v. Haase, 61 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 62 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. 2001).
46. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 2002).
47. Haase, 61 S.W.3d at 15.
48. The court recognized that unsigned papers may be incorporated by reference, but
the express language in the signed document must expressly refer to the other writing,
citing Owen v. Hendricks, 433 S.W.2d 164, 166-67 (Tex. 1968).
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valid consideration for the reasons discussed above. Additionally, the
court concluded that the three letters were so indefinite that they were
unenforceable, referring to specific language in the letters such as "tenta-
tive agreement," "essential terms," and "agreement in principle," all of
which evidenced an ongoing negotiation and not a final agreement. Also,
the letters were too indefinite as to the time of performance, the purchase
price, and the method for calculating a purchase price.
The questions of an implied assignment of a guaranty and waiver of
presentment and demand for guarantees were addressed in Escalante v.
Luckie.49 This case dealt with three separate notes and three separate
guarantees relating to each of the notes. In each case, Escalante pledged
CDs in return for a guaranty agreement from Luckie and Meyers to se-
cure obligations of American Teletronics, Inc. and Bent Tree Group, Inc.
to Mainbank. When the notes and loans of these two payors went into
default, Escalante cashed his CDs, purchased the notes and loans from
Mainbank, and brought suit under the guarantees to collect the principal
and interest outstanding under the notes. As to the first note, Escalante
was successful in proving his ownership of the guaranty agreements by
furnishing proof that he was the named payee, had possession of the note,
which was produced in court, and that the court admitted it into evi-
dence.50 The guarantors were nevertheless successful in defending their
guaranty on note one, since the guaranty related to a different certificate
of deposit pledged by Escalante, and Escalante failed to prove that the
certificate of deposit used to satisfy this note obligation was the certificate
of deposit referenced in the guaranty agreement. The court held that the
guaranty must be strictly construed and not extended by construction or
implication beyond its precise terms.51
With respect to the second note, testimony proved the execution of
note two and its related guaranty agreements as well as the assignment of
note two from Mainbank to Escalante. When Mainbank endorsed note
two to Escalante, it also delivered possession of the guaranty agreements
to Escalante. Each of these guaranty agreements was an absolute guaran-
tee of payment and not of collection. Cases recited by the court recog-
nize the implied transfer of a guaranty with the assignment of the
promissory note to which it relates. Factors indicating such an implied
assignment include the following: the mere assignment of the promissory
note,52 a sales agreement (without a formal guaranty assignment) refer-
ring to all loans which by definition include related collateral documents
including guarantees, 53 and competent witness testimony of such a trans-
49. Escalante v. Luckie, 77 S.W.3d 410 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, pet. denied).
50. Id. at 416; see also Schubiger v. First Newport Realty Investors, 601 S.W.2d 218,
222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
51. Escalante, 77 S.W.3d at 417 (citing McKnight v. Va. Mirror Co., 463 S.W.2d 428,
430 (Tex. 1971)).
52. Ray v. Spencer, 208 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1947, writ ref'd).
53. Boyd v. Diversified Fin. Sys., I S.W.3d 888 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.).
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fer. 54 Assignments of guarantees, however, are not assumed in connec-
tion with every assignment of a note. For instance, in Ashcraft v.
Lookadoo,55 an implied assignment was not present where the guaranty
did not exist in the asset file with the note, the assignee did not possess
the guaranty, the assignee could not produce the original guaranty, there
was no proof that the alleged guarantor had ever executed the guaranty,
and the guaranty was not specific to the particular note assigned. In the
present case, however, the guaranties of Luckie and Meyers specifically
related to the payment of note two, and Escalante proved the note had
been endorsed to him and he possessed the guaranty. Under such cir-
cumstances, the court concluded the guarantees were assigned to him by
implication.
In regard to note three, the trial court concluded that Escalante did not
make a demand for payment on the guarantors and held in favor of the
guarantors. The appellate court reversed, finding that Escalante proved,
by a preponderance of the evidence, the principal and interest due on
note three, the obligation of Escalante to Mainbank with respect to note
three, and the foreclosure on the collateral therefor. As to the require-
ment for demand, the court looked to the language of the guaranty,
which provided that the guarantors "waive presentment, demand, protest,
notice of protest and notice of dishonor as to each and all items constitut-
ing the indebtedness or obligation hereby guaranteed. '5 6 The appellate
court upheld these waiver provisions and concluded that based on the
language of the guaranty, no demand on Luckie and Meyers was required
of Escalante.
Finally, Escalante demanded attorneys' fees, but the guarantors
claimed that Escalante had failed to make demand as required by Texas
Civil Practice and Remedy Code sections 38.001 and 38.002 (Vernon
1997). 57 Escalante pleaded attorneys' fees under both the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedy Code and pursuant to the terms of the guaranty
agreement. 58 Since there was a waiver of presentment and demand, the
court concluded Escalante was entitled to attorneys' fees based on the
language of the guaranty.
The issue of whether a letter agreement was a conditional guaranty or
an unconditional guaranty of payment was presented in Farmers &
54. Vaughn v. DAP Fin. Servs., Inc., 982 S.W.2d I (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1997, no pet.).
55. Ashcraft v. Lookadoo, 952 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997), pet. denied, 977
S.W.2d 562 (Tex. 1998) (per curium).
56. Escalante, 77 S.W.3d at 421.
57. Section 38.002 requires as a condition to recovery of attorneys' fees that "the
claimant must present the claim to the opposing party or to a duly authorized agent of the
opposing party."
58. Attorneys' fees are authorized only when provided for by statute or by contract




Merchants State Bank v. Reece.59 The letter guaranty agreement was
from a bank to Reece to assure payment for products shipped by Reece
for the benefit of G.R.A.V.I.T.Y., Inc. The specific letter from the bank
provided that "each order placed by G.R.A.V.I.T.Y., Inc. will be paid as
agreed, seven (7) days after shipment .... ",60 Reece shipped the trans-
formers as requested, but they were rejected as being unfit and unsafe
pursuant to the agreement between G.R.A.V.I.T.Y., Inc. and Reece. No
payment was made under the purchase contract, and Reece made de-
mand upon the bank, which refused payment, claiming that the letter
agreement amounted to a conditional payment guaranty and not an abso-
lute payment guaranty. The applicable provision in the letter used the
words "as agreed," which the court concluded could only modify the
word "paid." The court concluded that the language could only have
meaning within the four corners of the letter if the "as agreed" term re-
ferred to the amount to be paid, as opposed to a separate specification
document not otherwise mentioned, referred to, or incorporated into the
guaranty agreement. Therefore, the court held that such language was
unambiguous and constituted an unconditional payment guaranty. Be-
cause Reece had repossessed all the transformers subsequent to the fail-
ure to make payment, the bank asserted an offset and a failure of
consideration. The court disagreed with the lack of consideration argu-
ment, citing the detriment to the creditor of its promise to pay the
amount as agreed. The court also cited Reece's detrimental reliance on
such promise and Reece's actual shipment of the transformers. Further-
more, the court held that the defenses of offset and failure of considera-
tion were unavailable to the guarantor since it was a primary, absolute
and unconditional guaranty.
The Fifth Circuit, in a case of first impression, considered the effective-
ness of waivers by a guarantor under the Texas Anti-Deficiency Statute.61
In LaSalle Bank National Association v. Sleutel,62 the guaranty securing
the defaulted note provided that the guarantor expressly waived and re-
linquished "all rights and remedies now or hereafter accorded by applica-
ble law to guarantors or sureties, including, without limitation . . . any
defense, right of offset or other claim which Guarantor may have against
Borrower or which Borrower may have against Lender or the Holder of
the Note .... ",63 In concluding that a guarantor 64 could waive such statu-
tory offset rights, the court relied upon the principle of inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius, meaning that it is assumed that the purposeful inclusion
of certain terms implies the purposeful exclusion of terms that are absent.
59. Farmers & Merch. State Bank v. Reece Supply Co., 79 S.W.3d 615 (Tex. App.-
Eastland 2002, pet. denied).
60. Id. at 617.
61. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003 (Vernon 1995).
62. LaSalle Bank Nat'l Assoc. v. Sleutel, 289 F.3d 837 (5th Cir. 2002).
63. Id. at 840.
64. The court specifically did not decide whether such a deficiency could be validly
waived by any other party. Id. at 841 n.4.
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The court cited numerous other provisions of the Texas Property Code
that specifically prohibited the waivers of certain statutory provisions. 65
It should be noted that the applicable guaranty provision in this case was
included in the typical "boilerplate" waivers provisions, and not in a pro-
vision specifically relating to the deficiency after a foreclosure sale.
IV. USURY
In Hoxie Implement Co., Inc. v. Baker,66 the court addressed what con-
stituted debt, detention of money, and interest in connection with a usury
cause of action. Hoxie Implement Company and Jim Baker (d/b/a Baker
Harvesting), who had an ongoing business relationship with an existing
receivable balance of $3,137.70, entered into a contract for the purchase
and sale of six combines for $1,025,636.00. For reasons not disclosed in
the opinion, Baker failed to purchase the combines, and Hoxie demanded
payment for same, alleging breach of contract with damages in the
amount of the purchase price and other sums. Prior to filing suit, Hoxie
sent a demand letter with an attached petition that Hoxie said it may file.
The demand letter admonished Baker to read the petition allegations
carefully. Taken together, the demand letter and attached petition al-
leged the breach of contract and asserted interest cost of eighteen percent
(18%) per annum from the date accrued. The trial court granted a mo-
tion for instructed verdict in favor of Baker, concluding that the demand
letter with the attached petition constituted a demand for interest under
the applicable statute, and that there was usury under two propositions:
first, the allegations made in the demand letter consisting of interest
charges of $91,135.00, and second, for prejudgment interest at the actual
rate at which they were accruing on the purchase price of Hoxie for the
combines from the manufacturer. The evidence was undisputed that
Baker did not enter into an agreement to pay any interest to Hoxie, and
that the interest Hoxie attempted to capture exceeded 12% per annum.
Notwithstanding the directed verdict on the usury claims, the court re-
fused to direct a verdict with regard to the breach of contract claim. Af-
ter trial on this issue, the jury found that no such breach had occurred.
On appeal, the usury verdict was overruled in part. Hoxie claimed that
in the absence of an absolute obligation to pay a definitive principal
amount, there could not be a charge of usurious interest and that if it was
65. These included a purported waiver of prompt payment to contractors and subcon-
tractors, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 28.006(a) (Vernon 2000); waiver of landlord's lien, TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 54.043(b) (Vernon 1995); waiver of rights relating to self-service stor-
age facilities' lien, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 59.004 (Vernon 1995); waiver of a broker's
right to a lien, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 62.002 (Vernon Supp. 2003); waiver of rights
under the Texas Uniform Condominium Act, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 82.004 (Vernon
1995); waiver of the landlord's duties to mitigate damages with respect to leases, TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006(b) (Vernon Supp. 2003); and waiver of a purchaser's cancella-
tion rights under the Texas Timeshare Act, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 221.041(c) (Vernon
1995).




charged, it was subsequently corrected. As to the first contention, the
court took a procedural side step, stating that Hoxie did not raise the
continent nature of the debt at trial. Hence, Hoxie waived such argument
by failing to affirmatively plead them at the earliest opportunity as re-
quired. 67 On motion for rehearing, the appellate court reversed itself as
to the waiver of the contingent obligation argument. Hoxie asserted that
there was no absolute obligation to pay a debt and that Baker failed to
prove the existence of an underlying debt. The court noted that the di-
rected verdict on the usury claim was granted prior to the jury's finding
that there was no breach of contract, hence no "debt." The court also
stated that the interest statute was clear in its requirement of an "actual"
as opposed to "alleged" use, forbearance or detention of money, conclud-
ing that if there was no actual use, forbearance or detention of money,
then there can be no interest and, consequently, no usury violation.
Next the court addressed whether Hoxie demanded usurious interest
with respect to the breached purchase agreement as well as to the existing
account receivable. Usury occurs only when one "contracts for, charges,
or receives interest that is greater than the amount authorized by
[law]." '68 Hoxie claims that its demand letter did not constitute a charge
of interest but was merely notice of the interest Hoxie was incurring and
that a petition may be filed. The court reiterated that the solicitation of
interest by a demand letter could constitute a "charge" of interest for
purposes of the usury statute.69 Woodcrest and the cases therein cited
required the intent of the demand letter to be the controlling factor. The
court found sufficient intent in the cover letter and draft of the petition to
find Hoxie intended to make an unequivocal and express claim for such
sums.
70
Next the court addressed whether the interest sought was within the
purview of Section 305.001 of the Finance Code. 71 The court found that
withholding payment under a contract where a debt has become due and
payable, but not paid, is the detention of money for which interest
thereon comes within the purview of that statute. In a footnote 72 the
67. TEX. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
68. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.001(a) (Vernon 2003).
69. Hoxie, 65 S.W.3d at 146 (citing Woodcrest Assocs., Ltd. v. Commonwealth Mort-
gage Corp., 775 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied)).
70. The claims and demands in the cover letter and petition were not worded in a
contingent manner. The demand letter referred to the breach of contract alleging "sums
due and owing," a reference to damages suffered by Hoxie in the "form of interest cost of
18% per annum" from the date performance was allegedly due until paid, to a statement
that Baker was indebted to Hoxie in the amount of $1,025,636.00, plus interest thereon at
the rate of 18% per annum, and to a demand for such recovery. Id. at 144. There is
additional discussion in the case concerning the manner of the claim of interest Hoxie was
accruing on its purchase from its supplier. Rather than clearly stating such sums as a loss
or damage to Hoxie, the demand letter characterizes such monetary loss as an interest
claim of Baker to Hoxie, and the appellate court concluded that it must be characterized as
an interest charge by Hoxie against Baker due to its specific language.
71. For purposes of usury determinations, interest means compensation for the use,
forbearance or detention of money. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 301.002(a)(4) (Vernon 2003).
72. Hoxie, 65 S.W.3d at 148 n.3.
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court distinguished George A. Fuller Co. v. Carpet Service Inc.,73 where a
petition itself was held not to be the basis for a usury claim, since the
petition is addressed to the court and not a demand to the other party,
whereas in the subject case, there was a cover letter with an attached
petition, which taken as a whole was a demand directly against the
debtor.
With respect to the account receivable usury claim, the court found
sufficient evidence that a rate was never communicated by Hoxie to
Baker. Despite Hoxie's testimony74 that its standard practice was to
charge 18% per annum on tardy accounts, Baker testified that he was
never billed for such interest and received no statement from Hoxie
showing such charges. Without an express and positive demand or com-
munication of such interest charge, there could not legally be a demand
for usurious interest. Furthermore, the court concluded that testimony
given at trial cannot constitute a charge of interest. Also on appeal was
the propriety of awarding attorney's fees in connection with the usury
award. The court found two statutes authorizing the award of attorney's
fees. The first is under the usury provisions of the Finance Code, which
authorizes the award of reasonable attorney's fees set by the court for a
person found liable of usury.75 Secondly, the court concluded that the
declaratory judgment relief statute permits recovery of reasonable and
necessary attorney's fees as are equitable and just.76 While Baker's attor-
ney failed to segregate the attorney's fees among the multiple causes of
action, the Court concluded that Hoxie waived any objection by failing to
raise the objection.
In Kaplan v. Tiffany Development Corporation,77 the court was faced
with a usury claim involving not only interest payable in cash on a note,
but also the conveyance of a five percent interest in property. Tiffany
Development Corporation and its sole shareholder, Leonard Garner,
borrowed $220,000 from Kaplan, evidenced by a promissory note bearing
fifteen percent interest and containing a usury savings clause that is re-
cited in full in the opinion.78 As part of the loan transaction, Garner was
required to convey a five percent interest in the property to a designated
corporation, which was subject to a redemption agreement allowing re-
demption for an amount equal to five percent of the net cash proceeds
from the sale of the property and five percent of any equity or participa-
tion interest relating thereto. Ultimately, the redemption agreement ex-
pired, and the note was increased and extended. Eventually the note
went into default, was accelerated, and foreclosure proceedings were
73. George A. Fuller Co. v. Carpet Servs., Inc., 823 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1992).
74. Hoxie's president testified at trial about its accounting practice of automatically
charging 18% per annum on tardy accounts. Hoxie, 65 S.W.3d at 149.
75. TEX. FIN. COoE ANN. § 305.005 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
76. TEX CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.009 (Vernon 1997).
77. Kaplan v. Tiffany Dev. Corp., 69 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no
pet.).
78. Id. at 215.
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commenced. The debtors obtained a temporary injunction and ultimately
an order voiding a subsequent foreclosure sale. The sufficiency of the
temporary injunction was the issue on appeal. In considering the merits
of the temporary injunction, the court addressed the substantive claim of
usury and whether a sufficient showing was made in connection with the
temporary injunction. The value of property paid, as well as money paid,
on a debt is considered interest and is calculated in connection with a
usury claim.79 The appellate court concluded that the debtors produced
evidence as to the maximum allowable interest under Texas law,80 and
that the value of the five percent interest in the property was worth at
least $50,000. Together with the stated interest rate, the value produced
an effective interest rate of 37.54% under the original note and 45.88%
under the modified note. The savings clause was held ineffective in this
case since the explicit terms of the note and redemption agreement con-
stituted a usurious contract.
El Paso Refining, Inc. v. Scurlock Permian Corp.81 considered the bur-
den of proof necessary in a usury claim and whether a guarantor had
standing to assert a usury claim. This case arose out of the financial col-
lapse of the El Paso Refinery, owned by a limited partnership, El Paso
Refinery L.P. The limited partnership entered into a crude oil purchase
contract with Scurlock Petroleum. The contract was guaranteed by El
Paso Refining, Inc. ("EPRI"), the general partner of El Paso Refin-
ery L.P. The guaranty contained a usury savings clause and a single refer-
ence to EPRI as a primary obligor, but otherwise waived any defenses,
including usury, that the limited partnership could have asserted against
Scurlock Petroleum. After the refinery defaulted on payments under the
crude oil contract, Scurlock Petroleum began charging a risk premium
and sent pricing amendment letters to EPRI, none that were ever agreed
to by the limited partnership or EPRI. As the liquidity crisis continued,
the refinery filed for bankruptcy and brought suit against Scurlock Petro-
leum for usury and other claims. The suit by the refinery was settled with
a release of liability and dismissal with prejudice. Subsequently, EPRI
filed for bankruptcy and made a usury claim against Scurlock Petroleum.
The basis for this suit related to the form of jury charges presented by the
court to the jury. The usury claim was submitted in a single broad form
question that set forth the burden of proof as a "clear and convincing
evidence" measure. In reviewing this standard, the court noted that this
issue had not been addressed for eighty years and noted an apparent old
line of cases supporting the clear and convincing evidence standard. 82
These cases were reviewed and dismissed, holding that the preponder-
79. Id. at 219.
80. The maximum lawful interest rate was 18% at such time.
81. El Paso Ref., Inc. v. Scurlock Permian Corp., 77 S.W.3d 374 (Tex. App.-El Paso
2002, pet. denied).
82. Id. at 380. See also Great S. Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 105 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1937, no writ); Rinyu v. Teal, 593 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd. n.r.e.).
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ance of the evidence standard is the better view, citing the penal nature of
the usury statute that requires strict construction thereof, and the silence
within the usury statute regarding burden of proof suggesting a prepon-
derance of the evidence theory.
The court also addressed the standing of EPRI as a guarantor to raise a
usury issue. EPRI argued that it has standing to raise usury since it was
an obligor, relying on the single reference to it being a primary obligor as
provided in the guaranty. In reviewing the guaranty as a whole, the court
noted that the waiver by EPRI of the usury statute and other provisions
clearly reflected a status of EPRI as a guarantor and not an obligor within
the meaning of the usury statutes. Furthermore, the court concluded that
the sending of a demand letter to EPRI did not transform EPRI into an
obligor for purposes of that statute. Without standing as an obligor,
EPRI's standing to pursue a usury claim as a guarantor was rejected.
Lairsen v. Slutzky83 involved a usury claim based upon a demand letter.
This dispute arose out of a Lake Travis subdivision restrictive covenant
that Lairsen allegedly breached by building a two story house. The par-
ties settled this dispute by Lairsen agreeing to acquire land owned by
Longitudinal Trust, for which Slutzky was the trustee, with the trust pro-
viding vendor financing. The agreement provided for interest only pay-
ments until maturity and limited personal liability of Lairsen to the top
twenty-five percent of the declining balance of the note. Lairsen failed to
make any payments on the note, and it was ultimately accelerated and
foreclosure occurred under the deed of trust. After the foreclosure sale,
the trust sent a demand letter to Lairsen demanding payment of the en-
tire balance of the deficiency on the note along with accrued interest on
the note, cost of collections, late charges, and attorney's fees as provided
in the note. Lairsen's usury claim was based on the fact that the letter
demanded payment of the entire deficiency. 84 The court concluded that
this demand for the deficiency amount was not a usurious demand be-
cause Lairsen never complained that the note was usurious and because
the demand letter for the deficiency amount, together with accrued inter-
est and other costs, was limited "as provided for [in the note]."'85 Since
the demand was limited to the terms of the note and no complaint was
alleged that the note was usurious, the court concluded that the demand
letter could not represent a usurious charge, clearly noting that no spe-
cific dollar amount was recited in the demand letter.86
The court addressed the sufficiency of the creditor's actions in notifying
83. Lairsen v. Slutzky, 80 S.W.3d 121 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied).
84. The foreclosure sale was for a price of $420,000, while the original principal bal-
ance of the note was $598,000, which amounted to a $178,000 deficiency.
85. Id. at 127.
86. The demand letter in fact directed the debtor to contact the creditor's attorney to
obtain the exact dollar amount, which the debtor never did. Lairsen, 80 S.W.3d at 127.
Use of such generic terminology may be appropriate drafting technique for demand letters,
however, it would not protect against usurious demands made upon subsequent full disclo-
sure of a usurious amount requested.
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a debtor of and curing a usury violation in Pagel v. Whatley.87 Whatley, a
crop duster, sued Pagel, a farmer, for nonpayment of an open account for
services rendered in crop dusting over a number of years. After a few
years of performing crop dusting services, Pagel approached Whatley to
help finance Pagel through the season. There was an agreement that in-
terest could be charged, but the exact amount was never agreed on, nor
was it ever reduced to writing. Whatley's standard procedure when cus-
tomers agreed to interest was to charge eighteen percent. 88 After numer-
ous verbal requests for payment, Whatley ultimately filed a lawsuit for
the principal amount of the open account.89 Attached to the original pe-
tition was a statement signed by Whatley reading as follows: "I, RICH-
ARD WHATLEY, hereby certify that I was fully and completely
informed by CHARLES HOOD of the possibility and consequences of a
usury violation in regard to collection work he is doing for me, and told
him to proceed." 90
The trial court ruled in favor of Whatley and an appeal was taken. The
primary issue considered on appeal was the sufficiency of such statement
attached to the original petition and whether the statement complied with
the statutory procedures for curing a usury violation.91 Pagel ultimately
counterclaimed for usury fifteen months after receiving the original peti-
tion. The court concluded that the statement attached to the petition was
sufficient to satisfy the notice requirements under Texas Finance Code
Annotated section 305,103(a)(2), 92 reasoning that this statement gave ac-
tual notice of the usury claim to Pagel (as evidenced by Pagel's subse-
quent filing of a usury defense claim), and Pagel had made no claim for
usury violation prior to a letter from Pagel's attorney alleging the same,
which was seven months after filing of the lawsuit. 93 On a motion for
rehearing in banc, Justice Dorsett dissented urging the granting of the
motion for rehearing on the basis that such statement did not satisfy the
statutory requirements. Specifically, Justice Dorsett reasoned that the
specific language of section 305.103(a)(2) requires the creditor to give
written notice to the obligor of the obligation. Whatley's statement only
advised of a possible usury violation and the consequences of it, and Jus-
tice Dorsett did not believe that such general and vague language satis-
87. Pagel v. Whatley, 82 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied).
88. Whatley testified that his computer had an 18% service charge that could be
charged to any customer's claim and that it was so charged in Pagel. Id. at 572.
89. The invoice and ledger sheets attached to the petition reflected seven credits for
payments, all of which were applied to principal and no interest charges were reflected on
the ledger.
90. Id. at 573.
91. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.103(a) (Vernon 2003) provides that a creditor is not
liable for usury violations if (i) within sixty days after the creditor discovers the violation,
the creditor corrects the violation, and (ii) the creditor gives written notice to the obligor of
the violation before the obligor gives written notice of the violation to the creditor or files
an action alleging the violation.
92. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.103(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
93. The Court noted that Pagel did not raise any issues concerning the sixty day period
requirement under TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.103(a)(1).
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fied the specific requirements of the statute. 94
V. DEBTOR/CREDITOR
In Duran v. Henderson,95 the court was faced with a case of first im-
pression of construing the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
("TU1FTA") 96 as to whether the extinguishment provisions of the TUFTA
were a statute of repose or a statute of limitations. This was the third of
three suits between Duran and the defendants. The first suit ended in a
judgment awarding a one-half interest in the net proceeds of a $300,000
note receivable. The second suit related to the illegal conversion of the
net proceeds of such note receivable. The third and current suit related
to conveyances of property alleged to be fraudulent conveyances. The
trial court entered judgment for the Hendersons, and granted a lien for
foreclosure of the conveyed property. On appeal, the court reversed this
decision. In construing TUFTA, Duran complained that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction since the TUFTA claim was extin-
guished 97 before the suit was filed. In other words, Duran alleged that
the exclusionary period was one of a statute of repose rather than a stat-
ute of limitations. 98 In determining whether this provision was a substan-
tive law or procedural remedy (which could be waived), the court
concluded that no Texas court had considered this particular issue99 and
referred to the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act. 100 The court concluded the drafters' intent was that the extinguish-
ment provisions be enforced as a statute of repose and not of limita-
tions. 10 1  Consequently, the court concluded that TUFTA's
extinguishment provisions operated as a substantive statute of repose and
not as a procedural statute of limitations.
This conclusion was not dispositive due to the complexity of the timings
of the various conveyances. The first conveyance from Duran to the
Duran Family Trust consisted of 165 acres (excluding a one acre tract and
house retained as his homestead), which occurred on November 28, 1995.
The second conveyance was of the one acre tract and home on July 10,
94. Justice Dorsett would look to the plain and common meaning of statutory words in
order to construe a statute and give effect to the Legislature's intent. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Harrison Contractors, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. 1998).
95. Duran v. Henderson, 71 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied).
96. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.001-24.005 (Vernon 2002).
97. TUFTA provides that a fraudulent conveyance is a transfer by debtor with the
intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors by placing the debtor's property beyond the
creditor's reach. The statute provides that a violation is extinguished if it is not brought
within four years of the transfer sought to be voided or, if later, within one year of the time
when the transfer was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant. TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
98. A statute of repose creates a substantive right while a statute of limitations is a
procedural devise. Duran, 71 S.W.3d at 837.
99. Id. at 838.
100. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS Ac, 7A-2 U.L.A. 266, 267 Historical Notes
(1999).
101. Duran, 71 S.W.3d at 838.
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1996 to his daughter, reserving a life estate for himself. The existence of
these conveyances were not known to the Hendersons until they discov-
ered them during depositions for the second suit in October 1999. The
original petition for the third suit was filed April 27, 2000. Consequently,
the third suit petition was filed more than four years after the first con-
veyance, less than four years after the second conveyance, and less than
one year after the Hendersons became aware of the conveyances. Duran
argued that since each conveyance was duly and properly recorded in the
Real Property Records of the county clerk, constructive knowledge of the
conveyances should be imputed to the Hendersons thus denying their
ability to rely on limitations calculated from one year from knowledge of
the conveyances. 102 The court looked to discovery rules applicable to
general fraud claims (despite the fact that these rules are in the nature of
a statute of limitations rather than a statute of repose), including jurispru-
dence applicable to this point. Under such jurisprudence, what consti-
tutes reasonable diligence to discover fraud is a question of fact for the
jury; the registration of a conveyance in the public records is merely one
factor to be considered. 03 There was not sufficient evidence to impute
knowledge to the Hendersons by reason of the constructive notice of the
registration statutes because the Hendersons' knowledge of the county in
which Duran owned property, that the note receivable was not in any way
related to the conveyed real estate, and such deeds were not in the
Hendersons' chain of title, were not sufficient to create a presumption of
constructive knowledge.
Duran also claims that he was not a debtor of the Hendersons until the
second suit judgment was rendered on January 19, 2000. The definition
of "claim" under TUFTA means a right to payment or property, whether
or not the right is reduced to judgment. 0 4 The first suit did not make
Duran a debtor of the Hendersons because it granted to the Hendersons
a one-half interest in the note receivable proceeds (being an asset and not
a debt). However, when Duran was paid the full value of the note, he
became liable to the Hendersons for reimbursement of their one-half
share and, at such time, he would have been a debtor of the Hender-
sons. 10 5 The note receivable had a maturity date of December 1996, but
was prepaid in August of 1995. The court concluded, without much fur-
ther discussion, that the prepayment in August 1995 coupled with the
judgment on the second suit was legally sufficient evidence to find Duran
was a debtor of Henderson at the time of the first conveyance in Novem-
ber 1995 because TUFTA section 24.005(a)(1) relates to a transfer made
by a debtor whether the creditor's claim arose before or within a reasona-
ble time after the transfer was made or the obligation incurred.
102. The effect of this would be that the first conveyance of 165 acres was not a fraudu-
lent conveyance since it would have been outside the statute of repose time period.
103. Duran, 71 S.W.3d at 839.
104. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.002(3) (Vernon 2002).
105. Duran, 71 S.W.3d at 840-41.
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The Hendersons next challenged Duran's ability to claim the full 165
acre tract as homestead. This issue revolves around whether Duran was a
single person or a family for homestead purposes.10 6 The testimony in
the case reflected that Duran's daughter and grandson moved in with him
in 1994, and Duran's social security income of $800 together with cattle
lease income was the primary means of support for Duran and his adult
daughter and grandson. Because there was sufficient evidence to find a
legal and moral obligation to support at least one family member and a
corresponding dependence by the other family member for such support,
the necessary familial relationship was adequately demonstrated and the
right to claim a homestead of up to 200 acres. 10 7 The Hendersons further
claimed that the character of the homestead property should have been
lost when it was transferred from Duran to the family trust. This conten-
tion was rejected because TUFTA applies to transfers of "assets," which
is designed to explicitly exclude property that is exempt under nonban-
kruptcy law. 108
Roebuck v. Horn'0 9 considered the sufficiency of a turnover order.
Horn held a $76,000 judgment against Roebuck and, rather than attempt
execution under the judgment, Horn sought a turnover order. The turno-
ver order hearing presented evidence of Roebuck's nonexempt property
consisting of $1,200 cash in a bank account, a pickup truck, motorcycles,
twenty-five percent interest in his law firm, and an undisclosed interest in
a leasing company from which his law firm leased its offices. The turno-
ver order rendered at trial did not identify specific property, but used
broad categories such as books, stocks, cash, other vehicles, and real
property. The issue on appeal was whether such broad description met
the standards for a turnover order. The court concluded that a reference
to specific assets is required in a turnover order, and the reference to
broad categories of assets as contained in the subject turnover order was
insufficient. 01 Also, Roebuck contended that the order required turno-
ver of assets jointly owned by Roebuck and third parties. The appellate
court found this was also an abuse of the trial court discretion since none
of the third parties were parties to the subject lawsuit.'1 '
The case of Blanche v. First Nationwide Mortgage Corp.112 involved a
lender liability suit alleging negligence, wrongful debt collection prac-
tices, conversion, mental anguish, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, invasion of privacy, and defamation. These causes of action arose
106. A rural homestead may consist of up to 200 acres for a family but only 100 acres
for a single adult. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(b) (Vernon 2000).
107. Duran, 71 S.W.3d at 842.
108. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.002(2)(12), 24.002(12), & 24.005. (Vernon
2002).
109. Roebuck v. Horn, 74 S.W.3d 160 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, no pet.).
110. Id. at 163 (citing Burns v. Miller, Hiersche, Martens & Hayward, P.C., 98 S.W.2d
317, 324 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no writ)).
111. Id. at 164.




out of the Blanches' purchase of a house from the Hewitts and the as-
sumption of the mortgage in favor of First Nationwide. Five years after
the purchase of the house, the United States asserted a tax lien against
the property previously owned by the Hewitts. Additionally, the federal
district court ultimately issued an opinion stating the transfer of the prop-
erty from the Hewitts to the Blanches was invalid, and the house could be
used to satisfy the Hewitts' tax liability. The Blanches notified their
mortgagee, First Nationwide, of this order; however, First Nationwide
continued to treat the Blanches as the owners of the house and obligors
under the debt. When the Blanches stopped making their mortgage pay-
ments, First Nationwide reported the delinquency to various credit agen-
cies and proceeded with foreclosure of its lien against the property by the
posting of a foreclosure notice. After addressing certain procedural is-
sues, the court addressed the sufficiency of evidence on the Blanches'
causes of action. As to negligence, the Blanches' evidence of damages
arising from subsequent denials for loans and the payment of higher in-
terest rates on subsequent debts were not determined to be appropriate
measures of damages for a simple negligence action.'1 3 As for elements
regarding the mental anguish and emotional distress claims, there was no
evidence of the necessary intent, malice, bodily injury, or special relation-
ship,114 and the evidence did not reveal actions of such a shocking and
disturbing nature that mental anguish was a highly forseeable result. Un-
fair debt collection practices were alleged in general and under the Texas
Debt Collection Practices Act' 1 5 and the Federal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.116 Since the only debt collection action undertaken by
First Nationwide was the foreclosure posting against the property, the ac-
tion was not considered unfair or a prohibited debt collection practice.
Although conversion of the Blanches' escrow account was alleged, the
debtor made a demand for return of the escrow funds and the evidence
did not reflect that First Nationwide refused the request. Finally, the suf-
ficiency of the evidence for the infliction of emotional distress claims was
addressed. Elements of this claim include extreme and outrageous con-
duct and severe emotional distress, neither of which were proven. The
court noted that severe emotional distress requires a showing of distress
so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it with-
out undergoing unreasonable suffering.11 7 The fact that Blanche had to
explain his bad credit reports to creditors and his employer were not suf-
ficient to satisfy this standard.118 With respect to invasion of privacy, the
only evidence of publications related to the statement made to credit bu-
113. Id. at 453.
114. The mortgagor and mortgagee relationship is not a special relationship for pur-
poses of these causes of action. Id; see also Cole v. Hall, 864 S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1993, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
115. TEx. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 392.301-392.306 (Vernon 1998).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2000).
117. Escalante v. Koerner, 28 S.W.3d 641, 646 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet.
denied).
118. Id. at 454.
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reaus and the inclusion of the Blanches' name on posted foreclosure no-
tices. One form of invasion of privacy deals with public disclosure of
private facts.'1 9 The disclosure of information concerning First Nation-
wide's credit history with the Blanches did not amount to publication of
private facts, but rather the status of the financial transaction between the
parties, which is a common action by creditors. Therefore, there could be
no invasion of privacy under the public disclosure of private facts. As to
the foreclosure notice, the court concluded that such an action would fall
under defamation rather than invasion of privacy. 120 The second form of
invasion of privacy is an invasion by intrusion into a person's solitude.121
The crux of this claim is to show a prying into the private domain of
another. 122 In this case, the only publicized information came from First
Nationwide's own records or other public documentation. Therefore,
there was no invasion of privacy by intrusion into another's solitude.
Finally, with respect to defamation, the court concluded that there was
sufficient information for a defamation hearing. First Nationwide's de-
fense rested on the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, which provides
that a consumer cause of action for defamation, invasion of privacy, or
negligence regarding the reporting of information by consumer reporting
agencies and users of information and furnishers of information should
be denied "except as to false information furnished with malice or willful
intent."123 Because the Blanches presented evidence that they had in-
formed First Nationwide by letter of the federal district court order hold-
ing them no longer the owners of the property and that, despite such
knowledge, First Nationwide continued to report to credit bureaus of the
delinquent mortgage payments, the court held that such evidence was suf-
ficient to raise a factual issue with respect to the malice or willful intent
aspects under the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act.
Bohis v. Oakes 24 is another case alleging violation of the Texas Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act. 125 The Oakes entered into an agreement with
Voges to build them a house. Construction financing for the house was
obtained by Voges from a prior customer, Lewis David Bohls. Various
construction issues occurred, and the Oakes sued Voges and Bohls for
various breaches and DTPA violations. Disputes between Voges and
Oakes were ultimately settled leaving the court to consider only the
DTPA claims and defenses. Bohls challenged numerous aspects of the
evidence, particularly including that neither Charles nor Michelle Oakes
was a consumer under the DTPA.126 Bohls' contention that the Oakes
119. Id.
120. Id. at 455.
121. Id.
122. See Clayton v. Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149, 153 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet.
denied).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (2000).
124. Bohls v. Oakes, 75 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied).
125. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon 2002).




were not consumers rested on the fact that there was no legal relationship
or written agreement between Bohls and the Oakes, that no transfer of
goods or services existed, and that there was no evidence of a purchase or
payment for services. As to Charles Oakes, the court, citing Sears Roe-
buck & Co. v. Wilson, 2 7 reiterated that it was not necessary for there to
have been a written agreement or actual purchase for Charles to become
a consumer. The DTPA requires only that a person seek goods or ser-
vices in order to become a consumer. As for Michelle, she was a con-
sumer under the DTPA by virtue of her being married to Charles and her
intent to occupy the home after it was built. Since no written contract or
privity between parties is necessary, the consumer may be one who
merely will benefit from the transaction, where such transaction was spe-
cifically required by or intended to benefit such third party. 128
Telephone Equipment Network, Inc. v. TA/Westchase Place, Ltd.' 29 is a
fraudulent transfer case. In this case, Mr. Charles Thorp was the owner
of both Telephone Equipment Network (TEN) and Southwest Communi-
cations, Inc. (Southwest). Southwest entered into a space lease with Wes-
tchase, but Southwest failed to perform. 130 Prior to the lease transaction,
Southwest had obtained a line of credit with Sterling Bank evidenced by
three promissory notes. Westchase ultimately sued Southwest for breach
of contract and thereafter Charles Thorp, president of TEN, acquired the
three notes from Sterling Bank for their outstanding balance of
$59,409.57, together with the security interest held by Sterling Bank in all
of Southwest's assets.131 Charles Thorp gave TEN the money to purchase
the notes from Sterling Bank and testified at trial that TEN's only pur-
pose was to hold such assets. TEN ultimately filed amended financing
statements reflecting the transfer of the security interest in Southwest's
assets. It also advised Westchase of TEN's intent to foreclose on such
security interest and sell all of Southwest's property.132 Westchase
brought suit against TEN and Southwest alleging violation of TUF-IA.
The trial court granted a temporary injunction prohibiting TEN from
foreclosing on Southwest's assets. Under TUFTA, a transfer is fraudu-
lent if, as to a creditor, the debtor made the transfer "with actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor. ' 133 TEN argued that
127. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Wilson, 963 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1998, no pet.).
128. Bohls, 75 S.W.3d at 479.
129. Tel. Equip. Network, Inc. v. TA/Westchase Place, Ltd., 80 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
130. In fact, Southwest never took occupancy of the leased space due to an alleged
dispute between landlord and tenant relating to the office's floor plans. Id. at 604.
131. Southwest's assets included inventory, equipment and accounts receivable which
had a book value of approximately $250,000.00. Id. at 605.
132. Thorp testified at trial that, while he had personal liability as a guarantor on the
Southwest debt, he thought it was unlikely that he would cause TEN to sue himself to
collect on such notes. Id. at 605.
133. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005(a)(1) (Vernon 2002). The TUFTA lists
11 non-exhaustive badges of fraud to assist in determining the requisite fraudulent intent,
which are: (1) transfer to an insider, (2) debtor retains possession or control of assets,
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Southwest's assets were not subject to an injunction since there was a
valid lien against those assets held by TEN. This argument fails if the
judicial lien, which would be obtained by Westchase under the breach of
contract suit, takes priority over TEN's security interest in Southwest's
property. Since the security interest in favor of TEN was an integral part
of the alleged fraudulent transfer, the effectiveness of such lien as to Wes-
tchase's lien was reviewed.' 34 The court proceeded through the list of
badges of fraud finding that TEN was an insider considering the common
ownership and management of TEN and Southwest and the shared busi-
ness address. The court also found that TEN attempted to conceal the
transfer based on the timing of filing of the financing statement amend-
ment and notice of sale. It was also discovered that Southwest had been
sued for breach of contract prior to acquisition of the security interest
from Sterling Bank, that the foreclosure intended by TEN would cover
all of Southwest's assets, that there was not reasonably equivalent value
between the assets transferred, and the consideration received, as well as
other significant facts, suggested an intent to defraud. As its second point
of error, TEN contended that such a temporary injunction would amount
to an illegal prejudgment attachment. 135 However, under TUFTA, an in-
junction is specifically permitted against further disposition of the trans-
ferred asset or other property. 36 The court dismissed the Harper and
Lane cases since they did not involve claims brought under TUFTA and
concluded that the assets of Southwest were clearly covered under
TUFTA. The appellate court also concluded that the irreparable injury
test for granting an injunction was clearly met inasmuch as Southwest
would have been rendered insolvent after TEN's foreclosure on all of
Southwest's assets, for which there was no adequate remedy at law. 137
Finally, TEN argued that it was not a transferee of Southwest's assets
since it had not consummated the foreclosure and could not be subject to
a TUFTA injunction. The court summarily dismissed this position, find-
ing TEN to be a transferee when it became a lienholder of Southwest's
assets. 138
A fraudulent transfer claim was denied in Patel v. Kuciemba.139 The
debtor, DAS Investment Corporation, conveyed property covered by a
note and deed of trust lien in favor of two separate creditors after the
(3) the transfer is concealed, (4) the transfer was made after the debtor had been sued or
threatened with suit, (5) the transfer was of substantially all of the debtor's assets, (6) the
debtor absconded, (7) the debtor removed or concealed assets, (8) whether the considera-
tion received was reasonably equivalent to the asset value transferred, (9) whether the
debtor was insolvent or became insolvent, (10) if the transfer occurred shortly before or
after substantial debt was incurred, and (11) if essential assets of the business were trans-
ferred to an insider. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005(b)(1)-(11).
134. TA/Westchase, 80 S.W.3d at 608.
135. Id. at 610 (citing Harper v. Powell, 821 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1992, no writ)).
136. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.008(a)(3) (Vernon 2002).
137. TA/Westchase, 80 S.W.3d at 611.
138. Id.
139. Patel v. Kuciemba, 82 S.W.3d 589 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied).
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time the deed of trust was posted for foreclosure. However, the deed of
trust note was paid in full by the transferring debtor prior to the foreclo-
sure sale. Even though the transfer was made to an insider of the debtor
for an amount substantially less than the market value of the property,
the court concluded there could be no fraudulent transfer since the one
creditor having other claims against the debtor approved, consented to,
and accepted the full payment of the deed of trust note. 140 Consider this
result in contrast to that in Telephone Equipment, supra. The court in
Kuciemba supported its opinion under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act provision, which provides that if a transfer is voidable, the
creditor may recover judgment only for the lesser of the value of the asset
transferred or the creditor's claim.' 4 '
VI. VENDOR/PURCHASER
In Skelton v. Washington Mutual,142 the bank sought to foreclose on its
purchase money lien and deed of trust after Mr. Skelton, the owner and
maker, died. Mr. Skelton had purchased the home while married, but
Mrs. Skelton did, not execute the loan documents nor was her name on
the warranty deed with the vendor's lien. Mrs. Skelton argued that her
homestead interest in the property was protected from foreclosure under
the homestead provisions of the Texas Constitution 143 and the Texas
Family Code.144 The homestead provisions under the Texas Constitution
are also covered by the homestead lien provisions under the Texas Prop-
erty Code, which provides that homestead liens are available only for
purchase money, taxes, and work and materials used for improve-
ments.145 The court concluded that the purchase money financing, al-
though not executed by the spouse, was effective by reason of its nature
as purchase money financing, contrasting the requirement for execution
of documentation by both spouses with respect to liens for labor and
materials for improvement of a homestead pursuant to Texas Property
Code section 53.254. Ms. Skelton also argued that section 5.001 of the
Texas Family Code, which limits conveyances of homesteads without join-
der of both spouses, preempted the lien of Washington Mutual. The
court again determined that, while execution of evidence by both spouses
would be good practice, it was not necessary in the case of the purchase
money financing where a lender held both the superior title and vendor's
lien on the homestead property, and where the homestead interest and
liens were created simultaneously.
140. Id. at 599.
141. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.009(b) (Vernon 2002).
142. Skelton v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 61 S.W.3d 56 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.).
143. Id. at 60 (citing TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (1876, amended 1973, 1995, and 1999),
which provides, in relevant part, that "No mortgage, trust deed, or other lien on the home-
stead shall ever be valid, except for the purchase money therefore, or improvements made
thereon . . .").
144. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.001 (Vernon 1998).
145. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(b) (Vernon 2000).
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The propriety of the use of a lis pendens 46 was considered in Mangione
v. Jaffe.147 Mangione, sued the partners of a partnership that owned a
shopping mall for breach of the sales agreements and filed a lis pendens
against the property. The subject matter of each sales agreement was the
partners' interest in the partnership, not their ownership of the mall.
Mangione plead to enforce the contract and to impose a constructive
trust upon title to the property to secure his claimed interests. Mangione
did not allege actual or constructive fraud, which is an essential element
for imposing a constructive trust; therefore, the court determined that
Mangione's pleadings only asserted a breach of contract cause of action.
Mangione was entitled only to specific performance of the sales agree-
ments or damages for breach of those agreements. Thus, the lis pendens
was properly cancelled.
The distinction between an option contract and a contract of sale was
determinative in Chambers County v. TSP Development, Ltd.148 A real
estate developer entered into a contract to purchase real estate within
Chambers County and submitted an application to the Texas National
Resources Conservation Commission requesting a permit to dispose of
solid waste on the land. Chambers County passed two ordinances
prohibiting the disposal of solid waste in certain areas of the county,
which covered the land subject to the developer's existing contract. TSP
sought a declaratory judgment against such ordinances pursuant to the
Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act and the Uniform Declara-
tory Judgment Act. 149 Under the Private Real Property Rights Preserva-
tion Act, owners are allowed to file lawsuits against a political subdivision
to determine whether a taking has occurred. The Act defines owner as a
person with "legal or equitable title to affected private real property at
the time a taking occurs.' 150 A contract for sale conveys equitable ti-
tle, 151 while an option contract conveys only an interest in the property
and no equitable title passes at the time of execution of an option con-
tract.152 In distinguishing between the two forms of contracts, an option
contract is indicated by the requirement that the seller accept a stipulated
sum as liquidated damages in lieu of the purchaser's further liability.'
53
Also indicative of an option contract is whether additional deposits will
be required, whether varying prices are set forth based upon the time of
146. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.007(a) (Vernon 1984), which allows the filing of a lis
pendens during the pendency of an action involving title to real property, establishment of
an interest in real property or enforcement of an encumbrance against real property.
147. Mangione v. Jaffe, 61 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. dism'd).
148. Chambers County v. TSP Dev., Ltd., 63 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. App.-Houston 2001,
pet. denied).
149. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2007.001-.045 (Vernon 2000); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 37.001-.011 (Vernon 1997).
150. TEX. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 2007.002(2) (Vernon 2000).
151. Lefevere v. Sears, 629 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ).
152. Hitchcock Props., Inc. v. Levering, 776 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1989, writ denied).




actual sale, whether alternative boundaries provided for the subject prop-
erty, and whether of a "time is of the essence" provision is included. 154
The court found the subject contract to be an option contract because the
contract did not impose a mandatory obligation upon the seller to accept
a sum stipulated as liquidated damages in lieu of the purchaser's further
liability; the seller's sole remedy was the right to keep the deposit and
cancel the contract. Therefore, TSP did not have standing to sue under
the Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act.
The case of Aguilar v. Weber155 involved a contract for deed and prom-
issory note. The Aguilars, as buyers, and Weber, as seller, contracted for
the purchase of residential property in Waco, Texas for the purchase price
of $52,000 with a $1,900 down payment. The contract provided that if the
Aguilars made timely monthly payments for a period of three to six
months, the Webers would execute a warranty deed conveying the prop-
erty to the Aguilars. The contract also provided that all money would be
forfeited to Weber in the event of a default by the Aguilars. Weber al-
leged that the Aguilars breached the contract by their failure to make
payments, pay taxes, and provide insurance, as required by the contract.
Weber sued for forcible entry and detainer. The Aguilars countersued to
dispute the amount owed and for failure to execute a warranty deed after
timely payments had been made for the requisite three to six months
under the contract. The appellate court noted that the contract did not
set forth a provision creating a landlord/tenant relationship in the event
of default on the contract for deed. 156 Thus, the forcible entry and de-
tainer action failed because it could not be based on a landlord/tenant
relationship. The appellate court ruled that a title dispute, other than
that of a landlord/tenant relationship, exceeded the jurisdiction of the jus-
tice court and dismissed the case.
FCLT Loans v. United Commerce Center, Inc.157 considered whether a
closing statement was an amendment of an existing contract of sale. A
dispute arose over the proration of property taxes even though the prora-
tion of ad valorem taxes was addressed in the sales contact.' 58 The prora-
tion of taxes was actually based on the previous year's ad valorem taxes
(since the current year's taxes were not yet available), and amounted to a
credit against the purchase price of more than the current year's taxes.
The closing statement contained typical language that prorations were
based on figures for the preceding years, and in the event of any change
for the current year, all necessary adjustments must be made directly be-
154. Chambers County, 63 S.W.3d at 840.
155. Aguilar v. Weber, 72 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no pet.).
156. A prudent draftsman should include a provision establishing a landlord/tenant re-
lationship upon default in contracts for deed as a necessary element on a forcible detainer
and eviction case.
157. FCLT Loans v. United Commerce Ctr., Inc., 76 S.W.3d 58 (Tex. App.-Eastland
2002, no pet.).
158. Id. at 59. The contract provided that "all current ad valorem taxes ... shall be
prorated between Seller and Buyer as of the Closing Date" and that the contract "shall not
be modified or amended except in writing executed by the Buyer and Seller." Id. at 59, 60.
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tween the buyer and seller. FCLT argued that the closing statement mod-
ified the sales contract and required the purchaser and seller to make
adjustments if the proration of taxes proved to be inaccurate. The appel-
late court held that a closing statement is a release of the title company
for distribution of funds and not an amendment of the contract of sale.
Furthermore, for a modification of an existing contract to be enforceable,
the modification must be based upon sufficient new consideration, which
was not present.
A typical "time is of the essence" clause was considered in 17090 Park-
way, Ltd. v. McDavid.159 The prospective purchaser of a building, McDa-
vid, brought an action against Parkway, the seller, seeking specific
performance of a contract for the sale of a building. The contract pro-
vided that "time was of the essence" and set March 31, 1997 as the closing
date. Parkway wanted to close quickly to take advantage of a tax-de-
ferred exchange; however, Parkway was unable to timely deliver a tenant
estoppel required under the contract. As a result, the parties orally ex-
tended the contract and later executed a written amendment of extension
allowing for a further extension to April 30, 1997 upon payment of an
additional $51,000 in earnest money. Despite this requirement, Parkway
accepted only a $25,000 payment. The parties again orally agreed to fur-
ther extend the closing date to May 30, 1997 for an additional $75,000
earnest money deposit. The $75,000 deposit check was deposited, but the
written amendment to such effect was never executed. On May 13, 1997
Parkway sent a letter to McDavid asserting that the contract had expired.
McDavid sued for specific performance, which the trial court granted.
On appeal, Parkway claimed that McDavid was not entitled to specific
performance because he failed to appear at closing and failed to pay the
purchase price in a timely manner. McDavid claimed that Parkway had
waived the time is of the essence clause. The appellate court found that a
waiver of the time of the essence provision had occurred due to the
course of dealings, including the numerous written and oral extensions,
acceptance of less earnest money than required by the contract amend-
ments, preparation of formal amendments by the parties' attorneys, the
depositing of the $75,000 extension deposit, the seller's testimony that he
was aware of the loss of the tax-deferred exchange by reason of the ex-
tensions, and the seller's continued desire to sell because of the attractive
sales price.
Additionally, the McDavid case considered whether a tender of per-
formance was necessary by McDavid. In general, the long standing rule
is that where one party openly refuses to perform on a contract, the other
party need not tender performance before bringing suit. 160 But where
tender of performance is excused, the complaining party must plead and
159. 17090 Pkwy., Ltd. v. McDavid, 80 S.W.3d 252 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet.
denied).
160. Regester v. Lang, 49 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, holding approved).
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prove that it was ready, willing and able to perform. 161 The court consid-
ered cases presented by Parkway, but found them distinguishable from
the subject case. The jury findings in the subject case were that Parkway
openly refused to perform its part of the contract and that McDavid was
ready, willing and able to perform; therefore, the actual tender by McDa-
vid was excused under these circumstances.
In Marshall v. Kusch,162 Kusch sued a predecessor in title for violations
of the DTPA and for fraud resulting from an alleged failure to disclose
anthrax on ranch land. The case began when Marshall purchased
6,828.20 acres near Uvalde, Texas in 1981. In 1987, there was an anthrax
outbreak on the Marshall ranch that killed livestock. In 1991, Marshall
decided to sell the ranch and told Greg Tom, a real estate broker, that
there was no anthrax on the property. In August 1996, Marshall sold the
ranch to Gilmore-Barclay, Ltd. with owner financing. In April 1997, Gil-
more-Barclay sold the ranch to Kusch who assumed the note, without any
disclosure of the anthrax outbreak. In 1997, another anthrax outbreak
occurred. As to Kusch's allegations of fraud based on affirmative misrep-
resentation, the court found that the evidence did not support the ele-
ments of fraud. Despite the fact that Marshall had advised Greg Tom,
that there was no anthrax, and despite the fact that Greg Tom discussed
with the buyer's real estate broker, Maurice Chambers, that there was no
anthrax on the property, the evidence and the testimony of Kusch proved
that such misrepresentations were never communicated to Kusch. Fur-
ther, Kusch did not rely on any such misrepresentation in his acquisition
of the property. Consequently, an essential element of a fraud cause of
action was missing. Next, Kusch asserted fraud by omission on the part of
Marshall. Under Texas law, "a seller of real estate is under a duty to
disclose material facts that would not be discoverable by the exercise of
ordinary care and diligence on the part of the purchaser, or which a rea-
sonable investigation and inquiry would not uncover. 1 63 The appellate
court held that Marshall owed no duty to Kusch to disclose the anthrax
since there was an intervening purchaser, Gilmore-Barclay. Since there
was no duty to disclose, there could be no fraud. Kusch also made claims
under the DTPA, and Marshall defended on the basis that there was no
deceptive act committed in connection with the subject transaction. Two
exceptions allow a connection to the subject transaction: (a) if a represen-
tation reaches the consumer, or (b) if a benefit from the second transac-
tion inures to the initial seller.164 The subject property was encumbered
by the purchase money financing retained by Marshall in connection with
the sale to Gilmore-Barclay, and Kusch alleged that such an existing lien
represented a benefit to Marshall and came within the exception for de-
termining a connection with the actionable deceptive act. The appellate
161. Chessher v. McNabb, 619 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981,
no writ).
162. Marshall v. Kusch, 84 S.W.3d 781 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet. denied).
163. Smith v. Nat'l Resort Cmtys., Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 1979).
164. See Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. 1996).
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court, however, refused to follow Kusch's suggestion, finding that Mar-
shall had already completed his sales transaction, and there was no bene-
fit to Marshall or Kusch acquiring the ranch.
VII. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
Bohls v. Oakes165 examined whether homeowners were consumers
under the DTPA in a suit against their construction lender. Charles and
Michelle Oakes purchased a lot and hired Vogel to build a home. Con-
struction financing was provided by Bohls. Construction did not go
well, 166 and the Oakeses refused to pay for overages on fixed cost items
after changes were made. The Oakeses sued both the builder, Vogel, and
the lender, Bohls, for DTPA violations and other causes of action.
Among other issues, the appellate court examined whether the
Oakeses were both consumers under the DTPA. The court stated that to
qualify as a consumer under the DTPA, the claimant must seek or acquire
goods or services by purchase or lease, and the goods or services pur-
chased or leased must form the basis of the complaint. The appellate
court held that Mr. Oakes qualified as a consumer under the DTPA since
he had sought Bohls's lending services and that Ms. Oakes qualified as a
consumer under the DTPA because she was a third-party beneficiary who
would have benefited by living in the constructed house.
In Raymond v. Rahme,167 an owner was not entitled to recover under
the DTPA because the record did not support a finding that the subcon-
tractor made implied warranties or breached an express warranty. In re-
sponse to the subcontractor's suit for amounts owing on work performed,
the owner counterclaimed for violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act and other claims. The appellate court held that the DTPA does not
create a warranty. To recover under the DTPA, a complaining party must
show a breach of an express or implied warranty recognized in the com-
mon law or in a statute.
The case of Nast v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.168 deals with the
appeal of a lawsuit by the insureds against their insurer and their insur-
ance agent, Daniel Clark, for violation of the DTPA and other actions.
Clark told Roy and Billie Nast that they were ineligible for the Federal
Emergency Management Agency's national flood insurance program in-
surance. The appellate court overruled the trial court on its granting of
summary judgment as to the Nasts' DTPA claim. The court held that
Clark's statements to the Nasts were fact questions and not statements
requiring specialized professional knowledge or training as an insurance
agent. The court also determined that Clark's alleged misrepresentation
165. Bohls v. Oakes, 75 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied). For a
more complete discussion of the facts, see supra Part V.
166. In fact, the original certificate of occupancy was revoked for construction defects.
167. Raymond v. Rahme, 78 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).




did not constitute a breach of the implied warranty under the DTPA for
failing to furnish insurance services in a good and workmanlike manner
because there was no relation to the repair or modification of existing
tangible goods or property.
VIII. LEASES
In Churchill Forge, Inc. v Brown,169 with three Justices dissenting, the
Texas Supreme Court reversed a lower court ruling that a residential
lease provision requiring a tenant to reimburse a commercial landlord for
loss, damage, or cost of repairs caused by any guest or occupant of the
residence is unenforceable and remanded the case to the trial court for
further consideration. In 1995, Joann Brown co-signed a lease with her
adult son, Carl Brown. Joann never lived in the apartment. The follow-
ing year "a fire which allegedly originated in Carl's apartment caused
damage to the apartment complex. ' 170 "Churchill Forge, Inc., owner of
the [apartment complex], sued [Joann] for breach of lease based on the
following reimbursement clause in the lease: 171
REIMBURSEMENT: You must promptly reimburse us for loss,
damage, or cost of repairs or service caused anywhere in the apart-
ment community by your or any guest's or occupant's improper use
or negligence....
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Joann, and the
appellate court affirmed that judgment on grounds that the lease provi-
sion was unenforceable. The court concluded that seeking reimburse-
ment for repairs caused by fire damage is a condition covered by the
Texas Property Code, and the lease provision that attempted to shift the
obligation to the tenant did not satisfy all of the statutory require-
ments.172 As a result, the lease provision was unenforceable.
The Texas Supreme Court, in dicta, observed that competent parties in
Texas "shall have the utmost liberty of contracting." 173 The court then
went on to reverse the opinion of the lower courts, holding that the appli-
cable statutory provision does not impose a duty on landlords to repair or
pay to repair tenant-caused damages. Therefore, the damage would not
169. Churchill Forge, Inc. v. Brown, 61 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. 2001).
170. Churchill Forge, Inc. v. Brown, 60 S.W. 3d 118, 119 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001),
rev'd and remanded, 61 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. 2001).
171. Id.
172. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.006(e) (Vernon 1995), which provides that landlord
and tenant may agree for the tenant to make leasehold repairs, at the tenant's expense,
only if all of the following conditions 'are met: (1) at lease commencement, the landlord
only owns one rental dwelling, (2) at lease commencement, the dwelling is free from any
condition which would have a material physical health or safety effect on an ordinary ten-
ant, (3) at lease commencement, the landlord has no reason to believe a condition de-
scribed in clause (2) above is likely to occur during the lease term, and (4) the lease is in
writing, with the repair provisions underlined, in bold print or in a separate written adden-
dum, the provision is specific and clear, and the agreement is made knowingly, voluntarily
and for consideration.
173. Churchill Forge, Inc., 61 S.W.3d 368 at 370.
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be a condition "covered by Subchapter B" to which subsection (e) re-
quirements would apply.174
The issue of premises liability was before three different courts of ap-
peal during the Survey period. 175 In each instance, the court held in favor
of the landlords. In Todd v. Pin Oak Green,176 a widow brought a negli-
gence action against an apartment complex owner after her husband was
killed by residents occupying the upstairs apartment. The Todds had the
misfortune of living in a complex where their neighbors frequently liked
to party all night with loud music. Mr. Todd was a pharmacy student, and
Mrs. Todd was a school teacher. When they complained to the guard
employed by the company providing security for the complex, they were
told to knock on their neighbor's door and attempt to resolve the com-
plaint. If this failed, the guard would call the police. They tried this
method with their downstairs neighbors without success. Two months
later they were disturbed by their upstairs neighbors - two male deputy
constables who had returned to their apartment around 3:00 a.m. with a
stripper from a local club. Mrs. Todd went to their apartment around
4:00 a.m. and asked them to stop the noise. They agreed to do so, but did
not. The following morning, Mr. Todd went to their apartment where he
was shot and killed. There were no witnesses to the confrontation.
Mrs. Todd sued on grounds that the apartment owner and the security
company were negligent in advising the Todds to approach the neighbors
and attempt to resolve the problem themselves. The trial court rendered
a take nothing judgment in favor of the landlord, and Mrs. Todd ap-
pealed. The appellate court upheld the summary judgment on grounds
that there was no basis for the landlord to have foreseen a dangerous
situation would be caused by any affirmative acts alleged by the Todds.
In Palermo v. Bolivar Yacht Basin,177 the plaintiff Mr. Bernard was in-
jured when he stepped from his boat onto the dock owned by Bolivar.
Under the terms of the lease, the Bernards were solely responsible for the
repair and maintenance of the leased premises, including the dock. In
upholding the summary judgment in favor of Bolivar, the court ruled that
Bolivar was an out-of-possession landlord that had relinquished control
over all of the leased premises to its tenant and could not be held liable.
In American Industries Life Ins. Co. v. Ruvalcaba,178 the wife and child
of an employee of one of the tenants in the office building owned by
American Industries came to the building to take the husband/father to
lunch. As they were leaving the tenant's second floor premises, the child
fell through an open handrail on the stairs and was seriously injured. The
174. Id. at 371.
175. Todd v. Pin Oak Green, 75 S.W. 3d 658 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.);
Palermo v. Bolivar Yacht Basin, Inc., 84 S.W. 3d 746 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002,
no pet.); Am. Indus. Life Ins. Co. v. Ruvalcaba, 64 S.W. 3d 126 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
176. Pin Oak Green, 75 S.W.3d at 658.
177. Palermo, 84 S.W. 3d at 746.
178. Ruvalcaba, 64 S.W.3d at 126.
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handrail did not comply with the then current Building Code for the City
of Houston. The trial court entered a judgment for plaintiffs in the
amount of $8,384,657.52. The appellate court reversed the trial court and
rendered a take-nothing judgment. The court based its opinion on the
fact that the owner owed no duty to the child because the child did not fit
the definition of an invitee or a licensee of the owner. The court also
rejected plaintiffs' argument that the child should be treated as an invitee
because he was a visitor to a public building. While acknowledging that
the Texas Supreme Court has adopted a similar concept by extending in-
vitee status to members of the public who are invited into a store that
sells goods and that is open to members of the public, the court stated
that there was no evidence in the record that American Industries invited
the general public into the building for the purpose of transacting
business.
The jurisdictional limitations of the justice courts and the county court
were at issue in three cases. 179 In Dormady v. Dinero Land & Cattle
Co.,180 the occupiers of a piece of property appealed a county court judg-
ment awarding possession and damages to the purchaser of the property
at a foreclosure sale. They claimed that the purchaser had no standing to
bring a forcible detainer suit because the foreclosure sale was brought
wrongfully. The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
on grounds that a plaintiff in a forcible detainer action does not have to
prove title.181 In this case, the purchaser had satisfied the requirements
of the forcible detainer action because the deed of trust established a
landlord-tenant relationship, the purchaser presented sufficient evidence
to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession, and the justice
court was the proper forum for a forcible detainer action. The court fur-
ther held that the issue of irregularities in the foreclosure sale was a ques-
tion of title that would have to be determined in the district court.
The Waco Court of Appeals, in a similar fact situation, reached the
opposite conclusion in Aguilar v. Weber.182 Following termination of a
contract for deed, the justice court, in a forcible detainer suit, entered
judgment for the landlord and the tenants appealed. The county court
affirmed the justice court judgment and awarded possession to the land-
lord. The tenant again appealed. On this appeal, the appellate court held
that the lower court lacked jurisdiction because a forcible detainer action
is predicated on the existence of landlord-tenant relationship; and the
contract for deed did not contain language establishing that relationship.
The tenants in Lopez v. Sulak1 83 also were removed from their prop-
erty in a forcible detainer action. The tenants' claim to the property was
179. Aguilar v. Weber, 72 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no pet.); Lopez v. Sulak,
76 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.); Dormady v. Dinero Land &
Cattle Co., L.C., 61 S.W.3d 555 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).
180. Dormandy, 61 S.W.3d at 555.
181. Id. at 556.
182. Aguilar, 72 S.W.3d 729.
183. Sulak, 76 S.W.3d at 597.
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based on an oral agreement. Following the adverse judgment, the tenants
brought an action against the landlord in the district court asserting,
among other things, claims for trespass, conversion, breach of contract,
fraud, and violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Pro-
tection Act. The district court entered a summary judgment in favor of
the landlord on grounds that res judicata barred relitigation of the te-
nants' claims. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's order on the trespass and conversion claims because they fell
within the jurisdiction of the justice court. However, it reversed the order
as to the remaining causes of action because the justice court had no juris-
diction to adjudicate those claims.
In Synergy Center, Ltd. v Lone Star Franchising, Inc.,184 a commercial
tenant brought an action against the landlord, claiming the acceleration
clause in its lease was a penalty and void as a matter of law. The tenant
asked for a temporary injunction to stop the landlord from declaring the
tenant in default and from presenting the letter of credit the tenant had
put up as a security deposit. The district court granted the tenant's re-
quest for a temporary injunction, and the landlord appealed. The appel-
late court held that the fact that there was a dispute between the parties
regarding the enforceability of the acceleration provision in the lease
could not bar Synergy from presenting the letter of credit to the bank for
payment. Thus, the court dissolved the temporary injunction.
In King's Court Racquetball v. Dawkins, 85 the court held that the lease
provided the tenant the right to "alter, reconstruct, rebuild and modify
the premises without restriction" did not entitle the tenant to demolish
the interior of the leased building and the leave the building in that de-
molished state. 186 The court also upheld the lower court's damage award
in the amount of the costs to restore the premises to their prior condition.
The tenant claimed that the correct measure of damages for waste was
the difference in the value of the property before and after the waste.
The court held, however, that the tenant breached its obligation to return
the premises in good repair, and the measure of damages for this breach
is the costs of repairing the building or returning it to the obligated
condition.
In Telephone Equipment Network, Inc. v. TA/Westchase Place, Ltd.,187
Telephone Equipment Network, Inc. (TEN) appealed a trial court's order
granting a temporary injunction, which enjoined it from foreclosing on
and disposing of property owned by a tenant of Westchase. The tenant
and TEN were both wholly owned by Charles Tharp. The tenant entered
into a lease for space in an office building owned by Westchase. It also
184. Synergy Ctr., Ltd v. Lone Star Franchising, Inc., 63 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. App.-Austin
2001, no pet.).
185. King's Court Racquetball v. Dawkins, 62 S.W.3d 229 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001,
no pet.).
186. Id. at 231.
187. Tel. Equip. Network, Inc. v. TA/Westchase Place, Ltd., 80 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
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had a line of credit with Sterling Bank secured by all of its assets. Prior to
the commencement date of the lease, the tenant sent a letter to Westch-
ase stating that it was terminating its business relationship with Westchase
and would not move into the leased office space. Westchase notified the
tenant that its conduct was an anticipatory breach of the lease and that it
would enforce its remedies under the lease if the tenant did not cure the
default. Shortly thereafter, Tharp notified Sterling Bank that he, as presi-
dent of TEN, would like to purchase the promissory notes signed by the
tenant in favor of Sterling Bank for the combined outstanding balance of
the notes of the tenant. Sterling Bank accepted the offer. Immediately
following the acquisition of the notes by TEN, the tenant stopped making
payments on the notes. Prior to the acquisition, the tenant had never
been late on a payment. TEN declared the tenant to be in default under
the notes and attempted to foreclose its security interest in the tenant's
assets. Westchase filed suit against TEN seeking injunctive relief to pre-
vent the sale. The trial court granted the temporary injunction and stated
on the record that it believed TEN's security interest in the tenant's as-
sets would be found to be fraudulent. The court of appeals upheld the
trial court's order granting the temporary injunction, thereby allowing the
landlord's interests in the tenant's property to take priority over the se-
curity interest of TEN.
IX. ADVERSE POSSESSION
The Commander v. Winkler 188 case addresses two issues regarding ad-
verse possession. The court first addresses whether the adverse claimant
had permission to use the property. The court then addresses whether
the possession had been repudiated and the adverse claimant had there-
after asserted a hostile claim to the property.
Commander owned property adjacent to the subject property. In the
1960s, after discovering that Winkler had paid taxes on the subject prop-
erty, Commander inquired as to Winkler's ownership. Winkler told Com-
mander that she did not know anything about the property, that neither
she nor her predecessors owned the property and that "as far as she was
concerned [Commander] could do anything [he] wanted to do."189 Com-
mander thereafter made several uses of the property until the suit arose.
In 1992, the Winklers attempted to sell the property to a Dr. Burch, but
Burch backed out of the transaction after being confronted by Com-
mander claiming the property as his own.
The court held that Commander's adverse possession claim failed be-
cause he had the landowner's acquiescence to use the property. By Win-
kler saying "as far as she was concerned [Commander] could do anything
[he] wanted" to the property, Winkler acquiesced even though she made
this comment after purportedly claiming no right to the property.190 It
188. Commander v. Winkler, 67 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2001, pet. denied).




could be deduced from Commander's affidavit that, at the time Com-
mander heard this statement from Winkler, he did not interpret it as "ac-
quiescence" or permission to use the property because he believed
Winkler did not own the property. The court's holding implies that the
permission to use the property is determined using an objective rather
than a subjective standard. Even though Commander may not have
thought he had the permission of the true landowner, he in fact did and
could not claim an adverse right to the land until such permission had
been repudiated and he had again asserted an adverse claim.
The court held that Commander's actual adverse period began to run
in 1992 when the permission to use the property was repudiated. Winkler
entered into negotiations with Burch to sell the land, which repudiated
Winkler's acquiescence to Commander's use of the property. When
Burch backed out of the deal based on Commander's claim that the prop-
erty was his, Winkler was notified that Commander was making a claim
adverse to her ownership. Because ten years had not passed since 1992,
the court held that Commander did not adversely claim possession for a
period of time sufficient to meet the ten-year statute. 191
The Trevifio v. Trevifio' 92 case involves a partition suit between two
different sets of descendants claiming separate interests in a 805-acre
ranch. The court clarified certain issues regarding partition suits. First,
contrary to what some cases have stated, a plaintiff in a partition suit does
not need to establish that he and the defendant acquired their title
through a common source.193 Instead, to compel partition, a plaintiff
"need only establish that he owns an interest in the property and has a
right to possession of a portion thereof. ' 194 In refuting a defense made
by the defendants, the court affirmed that there is no statute of limita-
tions on partitions.
The Waste Disposal, Inc. v. Larson'95 case addresses whether opinion
testimony in a trespass case is sufficient proof of diminution in value. The
current case law provides that "[a] property owner can provide opinion
testimony ... but the testimony must show that the diminution refers to
market value rather than intrinsic value or some other value."'1 96 Market
value is "the price that property would bring when offered for sale by one
who desires, but is not obligated to sell, and is bought by one who is
under no necessity to buy."'1 97 Intrinsic val6e, on the other hand, is "'an
191. If Commander had waited a few years to file his suit, he may have had a better
outcome.
192. Trevifio v. Trevifio, 64 S.W.3d 166 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).
193. The common source doctrine relates to trespass to try title. See TEX. R. Civ.
P. 798; Rackley v. May, 478 S.W.2d 219, 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Herbst v. Martinez, 307 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1957, no writ).
194. Trevifio, 64 S.W.3d at 171.
195. Waste Disposal, Inc. v. Larson, 74 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002,
pet. denied).




inherent value not established by market forces; it is a personal or senti-
mental value." '198 One of the landowners in the case testified that, as a
result of Waste Disposal's alleged action, her property was not worth any-
thing anymore, nobody would buy the place as is, and she would not want
to sell the property to another person. In response to this testimony,
Waste Disposal argued that such landowner's testimony did not establish
market value because she just testified that "her property has no
value."' 99 The court, however, disagreed with Waste Disposal's argu-
ment, as their argument was based on case law set forth in DTPA claims.
In the case of "negligence, trespass and nuisance" claims, the evidence of
the landowner's testimony that such property has no value was "legally
sufficient to establish a diminution in market value of [the landowner's]
property. 200
The Surprise v. Dekock20 1 case addresses the issue of whether there is a
cause of action in Texas for tortious interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of land. The Surprises had purchased land they intended to keep as
a long-term investment and for the use and benefit of their children. The
Surprises claim that the adjacent landowners, the Dekocks, forced them
to sell the property at less than fair-market value because the Dekocks
interfered with the Surprises' rights to use the property, including inter-
fering with hunting on the property, making personal threats, and using
racial epithets, and due to Dekock's interfering with their right to sell
their property by posting signs and calling prospective buyers. The
Dekocks argued that the Surprises had no claim because no cause of ac-
tion exist for tortious interference with the use and enjoyment of land.
The court, however, held that the Surprises did have a cause of action
out of the well-settled law that "'any intentional invasion of, or interfer-
ence with, property, property rights, personal rights, or personal liberties
causing injury without just cause or excuse is an actionable tort."' 20 2 The
Dekock's actions of posting signs and calling prospective buyers gave rise
to a claim for interference with the Surprises' right to dispose of property,
and the Dekock's racially motivated conduct gave rise to a claim for in-
terference with, or invasion of, the Surprises' property rights. The court
specifically made no comment as to whether the Surprises could prove
their causes of action, but expressly held that they the Surprises had suffi-
ciently alleged causes of action under Texas law.
198. Id. (quoting Star Houston, Inc. v. Kundak, 843 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ)).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 583-84.
201. Surprise v. DeKock, 84 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).
202. Id. at 380 (quoting King v. Acker, 725 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1987, no writ).
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X. DEEDS AND CONVEYANCES
The Hatton v. Grigar20 3 case addressed whether a gravel road was a
public road absent any express dedication. The gravel road extended
from Highway 36 almost to the Brazos River. Hatton, who owned prop-
erty just north of the highway and west of the road, claimed ownership of
the gravel road. Grigar, whose property was immediately north of Hat-
ton's property claimed a right to use the gravel road. The court upheld
the trial court's finding that the road was indeed a public road, even
though Hatton never publicly dedicated the road.
The court held there was sufficient evidence to establish that the gravel
road had been conveyed to the public by implied dedication. To prove
implied dedication, the evidence must show: (1) the acts of the landowner
induced the belief that the landowner intended to dedicate the road to
public use; (2) the landowner was competent to do so; (3) the public re-
lied on the landowner's acts and will be served by the dedication; and (4)
there was an offer and acceptance of the dedication. 204 The road, which
was never maintained by the county, did not contain public facilities, did
not lead to any public facilities, and was not allowed to be used by certain
individuals, was found to be a public road by implied dedication, relying
upon a long and continued use by the public.
The Wilderness Cove, Ltd. v. Cold Spring Granite Co.20 5 case involves
a deed conveying an interest in granite, where the grantor owned the
property in cotenancy with other parties. Wilderness Cove held title to
the surface estate of the property in question, along with a one-half undi-
vided interest in the granite. Cold Springs held title to a fractional inter-
est in the other one-half of the granite. Wilderness Cove and Cold
Springs sought declaratory relief to determine their respective rights in
the property.20 6
In assessing the claims, the court made two important conclusions.
First, while it has been held by the Texas Supreme Court that "building
stone belongs to the surface estate as a matter of law," and thus would
not be conveyed to the mineral estate holder, the court distinguishes the
present case because here the deed conveyed an express interest in and to
the granite.20 7 Also, the court extends the ownership in place doctrine to
the specific conveyance of minerals other than oil and gas, such as the
granite in this case.208 Applying this rationale, the court concluded that
the conveyance of the granite created a severable mineral estate.
203. Hatton v. Grigar, 66 S.W.3d 545 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.
h.).
204. Id. at 554. The court discusses each of these elements, with supporting authorities,
in great detail, especially with respect to the theory of implied dedication.
205. Wilderness Cove, Ltd. v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 62 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2001, no pet.).
206. Id. at 845-46.
207. Id. at 848.
208. The "ownership in place" doctrine provides that a severance of oil and gas from




The State v. Japage Partnership20 9 case addresses the issue of unity of
ownership and the legal effect of an easement. The facts arise from a
condemnation action, where the State condemned several acres of prop-
erty adjacent to Willowbrook Mall in order to expand a portion of High-
way 249 owned by Japage. The easement issue arose in the context of a
dispute over the amount of Japage's condemnation award. In addition to
a pad site Japage owned, Japage asserted it had certain easement rights of
parking and access in surrounding property that was also the subject of
the condemnation proceeding. Such easement rights arose under a Re-
ciprocal Easement and Operating Agreement dated June 14, 1985
(REOA). The State initially asserted that Japage's property was excluded
from the REOA and therefore Japage held no ownership interest in the
parking and access rights. The State conceded this issue and argued on
appeal that the language creating the easements in the REOA was not
effective because the same person owned all of the property that was the
subject of the REOA. Thus, the State argued that no easement between
parcels can arise because of the unity of ownership.
Although the State first asserted this unity of ownership argument on
appeal, the court addressed the merit of such claim anyway. The court
found that an easement between two parcels owned by the same person
can be created, but the easement will not take legal effect until one of the
parcels is sold to another party. 210 Even though one person owned all of
the property on the date of the REOA, and thus there was not a separa-
tion of ownership between the dominant and servient estates, Japage's
interest in the easements became effective on the date Japage purchased
the property.
In Vinson v. Brown211 the court addressed several issues regarding the
sufficiency of an easement's description, as well as the location of an
easement. Brown acquired a piece of property within a subdivision on
Lake Travis. In the deed granting title to Brown's predecessor (who ac-
quired title from the developer), an easement was created granting the
right to use "a park located about five hundred (500) feet East of Block
No. One (1)... and which park extends to a cove on the Lake and the
boundaries of which park to be marked and established by [grantor]."' '21
Vinson acquired the property known as the park area.
The court held that the description of the park is legally sufficient to
satisfy the requirement that the easement be in writing, even though the
description of the park area in the deed is vague. The court's rationale
was that because the language providing the grantor the ability to choose
the park's boundaries within a generally described area "furnished the
209. State v. Japage P'ship, 80 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet.
denied).
210. Id. at 623.
211. Vinson v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).
212. Id. at 225.
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means to identify the property interest conveyed with reasonable cer-
tainty. '213 The court also held that the boundaries of the easement,
which may be designated by the grantee in the event the grantor fails to
establish the location, could be established by the grantee's historic use of
the park area.
XII. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, CONDOMINIUMS,
AND OWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS
The homeowners' association in Mitchell v. Laflamme 14 failed to prop-
erly maintain the common area of a subdivision and the exterior of each
home as its declaration of covenants and restrictions required. When the
association was sued by several individual homeowners, the association
cited the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act 215 and argued that a suit
must be brought under the ultra vires provision of the Act by the owners
on behalf of the association rather than individually. The court disagreed,
stating that nothing in the law would lead to the conclusion that failure to
maintain certain areas constitutes an ultra vires act by the association.2 16
As to damages to the common areas caused by the association's failure
to maintain, the court concluded that because the association owned the
common areas, recovery for damage thereto belongs to the association
rather than individual owners. The court reversed the damages judgment
pertaining to the common areas only and specifically stated that a home-
owner does not have a personal property right in such common areas and
a suit thereon must be brought on behalf of the homeowner's associa-
tion.217 Whether the owners could sue individually for damages sustained
to the exterior of their homes, which they owned in fee simple, is a "more
difficult issue."'218 The court reserved judgment as to such damages be-
cause the trial court awarded the damages in connection with the com-
mon area damages, rather than separately. The appellate court's holding
regarding common area damages negated the need to address the dam-
ages to the exterior of the homes.
In Aghili v. Banks,219 a homeowner who failed to pay his monthly as-
sessments sued to set aside the foreclosure sale resulting from such failure
because the homeowners' association allegedly failed to give proper no-
tice of the sale. The Texas Uniform Condominium Act 22 0 allows a sale
without additional notice to the homeowner because the association's fil-
ing of the declaration of record effectively gives notice and perfects the
213. Id. at 227.
214. Mitchell v. LaFlamme, 60 S.W.3d 123 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no
pet.).
215. TEX REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-2.03 (Vernon 2003).
216. Mitchell, 60 S.W.3d at 128.
217. See id. at 129.
218. Id.
219. Aghili v. Banks, 63 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet.
denied).
220. TEX. PROP. CODE. ANN. § 82.113(a) (Vernon 1995).
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lien.22 1 The court explained that no further recordation or notice is re-
quired unless the declaration specifically requires such notice.
The foreclosed homeowner argued that the declaration did in fact re-
quire additional notice, so the sale was improper. The court stated the
rule of law that "[rIestrictions in such an instrument are treated as con-
tracts between the parties... [and]... [t]hey are subject to the same gen-
eral rules of contract interpretation. '222 Further, restrictive covenants
must be liberally construed so as to give effect to their true purpose and
intent. Because the language in the declaration was unambiguous, addi-
tional notice was not required, and the court did not set aside the foreclo-
sure sale.
Another case during the Survey period also pinned its holding on the
rule of law that restrictive covenants are to be construed liberally to give
effect to their purpose. Even so, however, the court in American Golf
Corp. v. Colburn223 held that the imposition of minimum dining fees by a
homeowners' association for eating privileges at the property country
club, while allowable, may not be charged as mandatory dues under the
association's declaration. Like the Aghili case above, the court noted that
"like any contract, deed restrictions are unambiguous as a matter of law if
[they] can be given a definite or certain legal meaning. ' 224 Because the
declaration was both clear and limited as to what charges may be levied
as dues, the minimum food and drink charge may be charged to club-
house members, but may not be levied as dues under the declaration.
Once imposed on those members who utilize the clubhouse for dining,
the court pointed out, the collection of such fees through the declara-
tion's lien mechanism is authorized.
In Cottonwood Valley Homeowners Association v. Hudson,225 a home-
owners' association appealed a lower court's ruling that it was not enti-
tled to foreclose upon its lien that secured the association dues. In this
case, the homeowner had failed to pay his monthly dues for some period
of time, and the association had filed a notice of lien. While the trial
court found for the association and entered a judgment in its favor, it did
not specifically grant a remedy of foreclosure on the assessment lien. The
association appealed the judgment requesting the appeals court grant
foreclosure, which it did, stating that the trial court abused its discretion
by not granting a foreclosure on the lien.
In Ehler v. B.T. Suppenas Ltd.,226 a property owner brought suit to
have certain deed restrictions set aside as unenforceable. The plaintiff
221. Aghili, 63 S.W.3d at 816.
222. Id.
223. Am. Golf Corp. v. Colburn, 65 S.W.3d 277 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001,
pet. denied).
224. Id. at 280 (citing Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKee, 943 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex.
1997)).
225. Cottonwood Valley Homeowners Ass'n v. Hudson, 75 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. App.-
Eastland 2002, no pet.).




owns land adjacent to the only area in a town that allows alcohol sales for
off-premises consumption. The deed restrictions affecting the plaintiff's
land prohibited such sales, so the plaintiff sought to have such restrictions
removed because they amounted to a covenant not to compete and were
unenforceable as an unreasonable restraint on trade. The court dis-
agreed, refusing to parallel deed restrictions to covenants not to com-
pete.22 7 The court pointed out that section 15.50 of the Texas Business
and Commerce Code, addressing covenants not to compete, specifies
such criteria "almost exclusively in the context of employment contracts"
and the statute does not govern the rights of owners of real estate. The
court further stated that there is absolutely no precedent where Section
15.50 of the Business and Commerce Code has been applied to real
property.228
The court buttressed its opinion by noting that the restriction does not
prohibit all uses of the property, just one specific use. Additionally, the
plaintiff did not have contractual privity with the party originally filing
the deed restrictions. Finally, the court held that because this restriction
touches and concerns the land, it runs with the land and affects all subse-
quent owners.
In Bankler v. Vale,22 9 the appeals court affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion that a homeowners' association had improperly relied on a provision
in its declaration, which allowed it to impose additional fees for emer-
gency repairs that were not objectively emergency in nature. The court
concluded that padding a reserve account for future emergencies does
not qualify as an actual emergency, since a future contingent condition
does not qualify as a sudden and unexpected event calling for immediate
action. The very nature of planned future improvements cannot equate
to an emergency. In addition, some of the funds from the reserve were to
be spent on cosmetic capital improvements, which are not an emergency.
The court in Brooks v. Northglen Association230 interpreted the provi-
sions of Section 204.010 of the Texas Property Code, which allows a
homeowners' association to retroactively increase association dues to the
extent such dues were not increased in prior years. The language of the
association's declaration states that such dues may be increased no more
than ten percent per year without a vote. The association retroactively
increased dues ten percent per year retroactively for sixteen prior years,
which amounted to an increase from $120 to $550 per annum. The trial
court found, and the appeals court agreed, that because the declaration
did not specifically prohibit retroactive increases, the ten percent limit
applied to each year, and the sixteen year retroactive increase was al-
lowed. Because the restrictions did not specifically prohibit or authorize
227. Id. at 520-21.
228. Id. at 520.
229. Bankler v. Vale, 75 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).




accumulation, the declaration's silence cannot be construed against ac-
cumulation. 231 Note that the court also used this reasoning to allow a late
charge on assessments. The appeals court was not persuaded that the
statute infringed upon the parties constitutional right to contract because
it did not "directly contradict any contractual provision [in the restric-
tions] prohibiting the accumulation of assessments. '232
Like Aghili and American Golf, the Northglen case may be cited for the
proposition that restrictive covenants are subject to general rules of con-
tract construction. 233 In addition, the court refused to allow section
204.005234 of the Texas Property Code to be used as a tool to contradict
the association's restrictions. Another portion of the restrictions affect-
ing different lots prohibited raising dues more than ten percent per year
without a two-thirds vote of owners. The court held, however, that the
"language of Section 204.005 will not support an interpretation that
would permit increasing maintenance fees in direct contravention of limi-
tations specifically set out in the restrictions"235 and this must be accom-
plished with a proper amendment.
The court did side with the individual lot owners, however, as it found
that in spite of the rule of law allowing homeowners' associations to fore-
close on a homestead for nonpayment of dues, the foreclosure of a home-
stead is not allowed for nonpayment of an assessment that is imposed
solely through the authority of Chapter 204 of the Texas Property
Code. 236 Such fees include those mentioned above that are allowed pur-
suant to Chapter 204, rather than contemplated in the restrictions them-
selves. Had the association amended the restrictions to include such fees,
foreclosure of a homestead would be permitted because such fees would
then arise by and through the declaration itself.
237
In Pinebrook Properties, Ltd. v. Brookhaven Lake Property Owners
Ass'n,238 a property owners' association sued the owner of the land on
which a lake existed seeking to, among other things, enjoin the owner
from promulgating rules related to the use of the lake. The particular
owner, as well as all association members, had the right to enjoy the use
of the lake pursuant to the association's declaration. The lake owner's
predecessor had recorded a document that granted the lot owners the
right to use and enjoy the lake "subject at all times to reasonable regula-
tion by [the lake owner] to insure the safety, sanitation and pleasure" of
231. Id. at 167.
232. Id. at 168.
233. Id.
234. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 204.005 (Vernon 1995) grants an association the right to
"extend, add to, or modify existing restrictions" via a process whereby a petition is circu-
lated to all record owners of the subdivision.
235. Brooks, 76 S.W.3d at 174.
236. Id. at 175.
237. Id. at 176.
238. Pinebrook Props., Ltd., v. Brookhaven Lake Prop. Owners Ass'n, 77 S.W.3d 487
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied).
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the association lot owners. 239
The court acknowledged that the lake owner was not entitled to a full
spectrum of rights with respect to the lake by virtue of its being the fee
owner. Because the land is subject to restrictive covenants in favor of the
lot owners, they retained an interest in and legal right to the lake. That
notwithstanding, because the association could not point to any evidence
that the lake owner had divested itself of its right to regulate the use of
the lake, the right was expressly reserved to the lake owner, and individ-
ual lot owners' rights to the lake use, therefore, subject to such
regulations.
In T.F.W. Management, Inc. v. Westwood Shores Property Owners
Ass'n,240 the court held that a property owners' association was not enti-
tled to an accounting of maintenance charges assessed against the lot
owners. The association was not entitled to an accounting because the
successor owner had no express, implied, or fiduciary duty to provide the
information. Since the association had no contractual right to an ac-
counting, and no fiduciary duty existed between the parties, the court
refused to imply such a duty on the owner.
XIII. HOMESTEADS
The Texas courts ruled on three cases dealing with relevant homestead
law during this Survey period. In Duran v. Henderson,24t the Texarkana
Court of Appeals held that a debtor, his adult daughter, and his
grandchild were a "family" for the purposes of the homestead designa-
tion, and the conveyance of homestead property to a family trust did not
constitute a sham transaction that would nullify the property's homestead
exemption from creditors. In this case, the plaintiffs, E.G. and Betty
Henderson, obtained a judgment against one of the defendants, Charles
Duran, which granted the plaintiffs a one-half interest in a note receiva-
ble worth $300,000.242 Several years later, the obligor on the note pre-
paid the full amount to Duran. Despite this fact, Duran did not pay the
Hendersons the one-half of the note's proceeds that they were due under
the judgment. At approximately the same time, Duran conveyed title to
a 165 acre parcel of land to the Duran Family Trust, reserving one acre
and a house as his homestead. He later conveyed the one acre tract and
the home to his adult daughter, reserving a life estate for himself. After
Duran failed to pay the Hendersons the amount due, they filed suit
against Duran, successfully alleging conversion. After discovering
239. Id. at 502.
240. T.F.W. Mgmt., Inc. v. Westwood Shores Prop. Owners Ass'n, 79 S.W.3d 712 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. filed).
241. Duran v. Henderson, 71 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied).
See supra Part I.
242. Id. at 836. The other defendants named in the suit that is the subject of this opin-
ion were Charles Duran's daughter, Christie Jean Patterson, individually and as guardian
of both the person and estate of Charles Duran, and Patresa Duran Gilbert, as Trustee of
the Duran Family Trust.
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Duran's two property transfers, the Hendersons filed the suit that is the
subject of this case alleging the transfers violated the Texas Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA)243 and requested that the court set
aside the conveyances, subject the properties to a lien, foreclose the lien,
and have the property sold in satisfaction of the lien. The trial court
found for the Hendersons and set aside the two conveyances, but ordered
only part of the property sold.
On appeal, Duran argued inter alia that there was insufficient evidence
for the Court's findings concerning Duran's debt owed to the Hendersons
and his intent to defraud, delay, or hinder them. Duran additionally ar-
gued that he did not waive his homestead rights by transferring the 165
acre parcel to the trust and all of the property conveyed was homestead
property and therefore not subject to the provisions of TUFTA. Al-
though the parties did not dispute whether the parcels were "rural" or
"urban" under the homestead laws, they did dispute whether Duran, his
daughter, and his grandson constituted a family, and therefore whether
Duran could claim 100 or 200 acres as his rural homestead.2 44 The Court
held that a "family" may include a parent and his adult child as long as
the parent has an obligation to support the adult child and the child is
dependent on the parent for support. In this case, a familial relationship
had been adequately demonstrated because before Duran conveyed the
property, he, his adult daughter, and his grandson all lived together on
the premises and relied on his social security income as their sole means
of support. The court found that the three were not merely living to-
gether and sharing expenses; instead, Duran had an apparent moral obli-
gation to provide care for his daughter and grandson, and they depended
upon Duran for such support. Because the three constituted a family,
Duran was entitled to claim the entire 165 acres as his homestead when
he made the conveyances.
After concluding that Duran could properly claim homestead rights on
the entire property, the court held that TUFTA did not apply to property
that is exempt under nonbankruptcy law. The holding validated Duran's
right to transfer the property free of the claims of creditors. However,
this right to transfer exempt property is limited. If the transfer was not
made with the intent for title to vest in the grantee, but rather to give an
apparent right "only for the purpose of protecting it against the claims of
the original owner's creditors after he should cease to use it for the pur-
pose that gave the exemption, it would be subject to seizure and sale. '245
This limitation applies only in a situation where the owner ceased using
the property as a homestead. There was no evidence indicating that
Duran's transfer of the property was a sham transaction, so the appellate
court reversed the portion of the trial court's ruling that set the convey-
243. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. ch. 24 (Vernon 2002).
244. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(b) (Vernon 2000) (stating that a family may claim
200 acres as its rural homestead, whereas a single person may only claim 100 acres).
245. Duran, 71 S.W.3d at 843.
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ances aside and ordered the property sold, and instead ruled that the
Hendersons take nothing on their claims.
Estate of Montague v. National Loan Investors246 was another case de-
cided during this survey period dealing with homestead issues. In the
1970's, Montague acquired a tract of land known as Montague Ranch
from his mother. By 1982, Montague had sold all but 73 acres of the
Ranch. As part of the sale of the Ranch, he had acquired a house on
Lake Amistad in Del Rio, Texas. Later, in 1984, in conjunction with the
restructuring of his personal debt, Montague and his wife listed the
Ranch as either their homestead or primary address on a loan office
worksheet, a real estate checklist, and a disclosure statement. Montague
effected the loan restructuring on July 18, 1984, and, along with his wife,
executed a deed of trust on the Ranch. As a part of the transaction and
at the bank's request, the Montagues also executed a homestead designa-
tion on August 16, 1984 which listed the Lake Amistad property as their
homestead. The homestead designation also stated that the Montagues
had abandoned their homestead at the Ranch, and that the couple dis-
claimed any homestead rights in the Ranch. The couple paid on the note
until Montague's death on August 2, 1988. In 1997, Commercial Loan
Services acquired the note and notified Montague's Estate, his wife, and
his wife's son of its intent to foreclose. Rather than foreclosing, CLS sued
the Estate. CLS subsequently transferred the note to National Loan In-
vestors, which was substituted as plaintiff. The trial jury found that
$296,151.31 was still due on the note, that the Montagues resided on the
Ranch in August, 1984 with the intent of claiming it as their homestead,
that they did not abandon their homestead claim on August 16, 1984, and
that they were not estopped from claiming the Ranch as their homestead.
The court, however, granted NLI's motion for judgement notwithstand-
ing the verdict in regards to the estoppel issue, and entered judgement for
NLI in the amount of $286,151,31.
On appeal, the court addressed the estoppel issue by stating that
whether a claimant is estopped from claiming a homestead exemption
due to a disclaimer depends on the circumstances. If a claimant only
owns one piece of property that he occupies as a home, he is not estopped
from claiming it as a homestead regardless of either oral or written decla-
rations to the contrary. Thus, because the factual possession and use of
the property at the time of the mortgage is so obvious that the lender is
charged with notice of the homestead. 247 Similarly, if the claimant owns
two pieces of property, but uses the only one suitable for use as a home-
stead, the creditor will be charged with notice of the homestead.2 48 The
court held that it is only in the situation where a claimant owns multiple
tracts of land and each of them is suitable for use as a homestead that a
246. Estate of Montague v. Nat'l Loan Investors, L.P., 70 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2001, pet. denied).




claimant could be estopped by a disclaimer.2 49 In that situation, a claim-
ant could be estopped "where physical facts open to observation lead to a
conclusion that the property .. .is not the homestead, the use of the
property is not inconsistent with the claimant's representations that the
property is disclaimed .. and the representations were intended to be
and were actually relied upon by the lender. '250 This type of ambiguous
possession may allow a lender to successfully assert estoppel against a
homestead claimant. The court concluded that physical facts open to ob-
servation showed that the Ranch was being used as a homestead. There-
fore, more than a scintilla of evidence supported the jury's original
finding that the Estate and Montague's wife were not estopped from
claiming the exemption.
Concerning the abandonment issue, the court held that
"[albandonment of a homestead requires both the cessation or discontin-
uance of use of the property as a homestead, coupled with the intent to
permanently abandon the homestead," and "[t]he evidence relied on as
establishing abandonment of a homestead must make it undeniably clear
that there has been a total abandonment with an intention not to return
and claim the exemption. 2 51 After citing the same evidence as in the
estoppel argument to reject the abandonment, the court stated that the
abandonment argument also failed for a second reason. Even assuming
that the Montagues did in fact abandon their homestead on August 16,
1984, the lien could not be validated by the abandonment. This is be-
cause a mortgage or lien that is void as illegally levied against a home-
stead can not have effect even after the property is "no longer impressed
with the homestead character. '2 52 Therefore, the trial court's judgment
was reversed and rendered such that the Montagues were not estopped
from claiming the Ranch as their homestead against the enforcement of
NLI's Deed of Trust.
Skelton v. Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. 253 involved a purchase
money lien on real property. Daphney and Rusty Skelton were married
in 1984 and remained married until Rusty's death in June, 1998. In De-
cember, 1995, Rusty purchased a lot and house through a loan from
Great Western Mortgage Corporation. Because of certain negative refer-
ences in her credit history, Daphney was not involved in the purchase and
did not sign any documents in connection with the purchase or the loan.
Rusty executed the deed of trust to Great Western in his own name, recit-
ing that he was a single man. Daphney later stated that she was unaware
Rusty had taken title purporting to be single. Payments were made on
249. Id.
250. Id. (quoting First Interstate Bank of Bedford v. Bland, 810 S.W.2d 277, 285-86
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
251. Id. at 248.
252. Id. at 248-49 (quoting Laster v. First Huntsville Props. Co., 826 S.W.2d 125, 130
(Tex. 1991)).




the loan, using funds earned by both individuals, until April, 1997. After
Rusty's death, the probate court granted the application of Washington
Mutual Bank, F.A., as assignee of Great Western, to foreclose its lien on
the property. Daphney asserted, inter alia, that the property was her
homestead and, therefore, not subject to foreclosure. She cited section
5.001 of the Texas Property Code, which limits the conveyance of home-
steads without the joinder of both spouses, to argue that her homestead
claim was superior to Washington Mutual's deed of trust because she did
not execute any document creating the lien. She further claimed that her
homestead interest was superior to Washington Mutual's purchase money
lien.
The court disagreed with Daphney on both counts, citing both Arti-
cle XVI, section 50 of the Texas Constitution, and section 41.001(b) of the
Texas Property Code as authority for the position that a purchase money
interest may be attached to a homestead. The court further held that "an
encumbrance existing against property cannot be affected by the subse-
quent impression of the homestead exemption on the land so as to avoid
or destroy pre-existing rights. 12 54 In regards to Daphney's claim that the
lien was unenforceable because she did not execute any documents to
create it, the court concluded that a vendor's purchase lien is enforceable
even without documentation.2 55 Additionally, the lien could also be en-
forced without Daphney's execution of any documents because the
homestead interest and the lien were created simultaneously.2 56 There-
fore, no interest was actually transferred after creation of the homestead
interest in violation of section 5.001 of the Texas Property Code.
XIV. BROKERS
In Hamlett v. Holcomb,257 a listing broker was sued for breach of fidu-
ciary duty and tortious interference with contract. Laurie Hamlett en-
gaged Evelyn Holcomb as her listing broker. Subsequently, a contract for
the purchase of Ms. Hamlett's home was entered into with Ricardo Soto.
The contract contained a typical financing contingency, allowing the pur-
chaser to repudiate the contract if he was unable to obtain financing.
During the pendency of the contract, Soto lost his job and his prospective
lenders refused to provide the financing necessary to purchase the home.
Accordingly, Soto repuditated the purchase contract. The agent,
Holcomb, tried to persuade Hamlett to allow the repuditation without
any compensation. 258 Apparently incensed by the broker's action, Ham-
lett sued the broker for tortious interference and breach of fiduciary duty.
The court first reviewed the contract and determined that Soto had the
254. Id. at 60.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Hamlett v. Holcomb, 69 S.W.3d 816 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).
258. This case does not indicate the facts giving rise to this assertion; therefore, we are
left to assume that a repudiation for failure to obtain appropriate financing may have given
rise to a claim for the earnest money deposit or other liquidated damages.
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contractual right to repudiate the contract and did not breach it. There-
fore, because there had been no breach of contract, the basis of Hamlett's
claim of breach of fiduciary duty and tortious intereference necessarily
failed because a breach of contract is a condition precedent to maintain-
ing such causes of action.259
In N.T. Development, Inc. v. Petersen,260 a broker alleged malicious
prosecution on behalf of the principal who notified the Texas Real Estate
Commission of a violation of the Texas Real Estate Licensing Act com-
mitted by the broker. This suit arose out of the rescission of an existing
development agreement. The defendant brokers, Petersen and DiGino,
listed N.T.'s property for sale. DiGino admitted at the time, however,
that she was only a sales agent, and not a real estate broker, and that her
sponsoring broker, Williams & Williams, was unaware of the listing. Such
actions violate the Texas Real Estate Licensing Act. In connection with
other unpleasanties associated with the contract rescission, N.T. notified
the Texas Real Estate Commission of Petersen's and DiGino's violation
of the Texas Real Estate Licensing Act, and the defendants then counter-
sued the plaintiffs for malicious prosecution. 261 When Williams & Wil-
liams learned of the violation, Petersen and DiGino were terminated. It
was the actions of Williams & Williams that caused the injury to Petersen
and DiGino and not any action on behalf of N.T. 262 Ordinary losses inci-
dent to defending a civil lawsuit (including inconvenience, embarrass-
ment, discovery, expense or attorney's fees) do not amount to special
damages and consequently, Petersen and DiGino could not sustain a ma-
licious prosecution cause of action.
XV. TITLE INSURANCE
While there were no title insurance cases during the Survey period
worthy of note, there were significant changes in the title insurance indus-
try in Texas. In addition to the standard array of changes for administra-
tive and rate rule updates in the Basic Manual of Rules, Rates and Forms
for the Writing of Title Insurance in the State of Texas ("Texas Title Man-
259. Hamlett, 69 S.W.3d at 820 (citing Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 22
S.W.3d 857 (Tex. 2000), requiring a breach of contract as a condition to a claim for breach
of fiduciary duty, and Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573 (Tex.
2001), where the failure to prove fraud defeated conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims.
260. N.T. Dev., Inc. v. Petersen, 79 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet.
denied).
261. A cause of action for malicious prosecution requires seven factors: "(1) that a
criminal prosecution was filed against the plaintiff; (2) the defendant caused the filing;
(3) the prosecution terminated in the plaintiff's favor; (4) the plaintiff was innocent;(5) there was an absence of probable cause for the criminal proceedings; (6) the defendants
mailiciously filed the criminal charge; and (7) damage to the plaintiff." Petersen, 79 S.W.3d
at 234 (citing Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 952 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1997)).
262. The seventh requirement for malicious prosecution requires some special injury to
the plaintiff, which is a physical interference with his person or property, such as arrest,
attachment, injunction or sequestration. Id. (citing Texas Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921
S.W.2d 203, 208-09 (Tex. 1996)).
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ual"), there were a number of endorsement forms added to the list of
endorsements available for issuance in the State of Texas.
An endorsement commonly referred to as the First Loss Endorse-
ment 263 is now available. The First Loss Endorsement provides assur-
ances to the insured lender that any loss suffered in excess of 10% of the
insured amount will cause liability under the title policy without the ac-
celeration of the debt. This endorsement would be useful in situations
where numerous properties secure large indebtedness, and the title fail-
ure on one of the properties would not be of such importance that the
lender would desire an acceleration of all of the indebtedness. The First
Loss Endorsement is not available for residential real property, and the
premium for the issuance of this endorsement is $25.
Another endorsement now available in Texas is the Last Dollar En-
dorsement.264 This endorsement provides that any payments made upon
the insured indebtedness will not reduce the coverage under the specified
mortgage, except to the extent that such payments on the insured indebt-
edness reduced the total amount thereof below the insured amount of the
policy. This endorsement is useful in complex lending transactions in-
volving a number of different properties, each with its own insured
amount, securing a total indebtedness equal to the amount of insurance
on all of the collateral property. This endorsement is also not available
on residential real property, and the premium for the issuance is $25.
A Mortgagee Policy Aggregation Endorsement 265 is also now available
in Texas. The purpose of this endorsement is to establish an aggregate
title company liability equal to all of the indebtedness insured under mul-
tiple title policies. This endorsement would also be used in a complex
transaction where a single loan is secured by multiple properties. This
endorsement is available with respect to residential real property only,
and the premium for this endorsement is $25.
A Planned Unit Development Endorsement 266 is now available for a
planned unit developments in Texas. This endorsement insures against
violations of restrictive covenants (other than environmental matters)
and that restrictive covenants do not contain provisions that will cause a
forfeiture or reversion of title. It also protects against the priority of any
lien for charges and assessments from an owners' association having pri-
ority over the lien of the insured mortgage, protects against forced re-
moval of existing structures due to encroachments on adjoining lands or
easements, and protects against the failure of title by reason of a right of
first refusal to purchase the property. This endorsement is available only
for residential real property, and the premium for same is $25.
The Restrictions, Encroachments, Mineral Endorsements, commonly
263. TEXAS STATE BOARD OF INSURANCE, BASIC MANUAL OF RULES, RULES AND
FORMS: FOR THE WRITING OF TITLE INSURANCE IN THE STATE OF TEXAS § II, Form T-14
(Hart Graphics 2002).
264. Id. at § II, Form T-15.
265. Id. at § II, Form T-16.
266. Id. at § 1I, Form T-17.
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referred to as a comprehensive endorsement, is also now available.2 67
This endorsement is available to a mortgagee to insure against covenants;
conditions and restrictions that can divest, subordinate or extinguish the
lien of the insured mortgage; violations of conditions; covenants and re-
strictions; the existence of certain easements, liens, charges and assess-
ments; options and rights of first refusal with respect to the property;
encroachments of improvements onto adjoining lands or easements; fu-
ture violations that could result in a loss of priority or unenforceability of
the insured mortgage; damage to improvements (including lawn, shrub-
bery and trees) resulting from encroachments or surface use rights; court
order requiring removal of encroachments or any existing improvements
due to violations of covenants, conditions and restrictions or building set-
back lines. The premium for this comprehensive endorsement is five per-
cent of the basic rate for residential real property and ten percent of the
basic rate on other forms of real property.
XVI. CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS, MECHANIC'S LIENS
AND CONSTRUCTION ISSUES
In Holladay v. CW&A, Inc.,268 Holladay hired CW&A to provide
asphalt and paving work for a number of projects. Holladay contended
that the work was faulty and necessitated repairs by third parties. The
subcontractor, CW&A, Inc., sued the general contractor, Tony Holladay
d/b/a Holladay Construction Corp., for breach of contract for failing to
pay money when due that had been received from the owner of the prop-
erty. CW&A contended that the principals of Holladay Construction
were liable under the Texas Construction Fund Act 269 for retention of
trust funds. Holladay sought an offset or credit for the cost of repairs.
Under the Texas Construction Fund Act, a trustee of funds is liable for
the misapplication of trust funds if he intentionally or knowingly or with
the intent to defraud, directly or indirectly retains, uses, disburses, or oth-
erwise diverts trust funds without first paying all current or past due obli-
gations incurred by the trustee to the beneficiary of the trust funds. The
court cited Lively v. Carpet Services, Inc.270 in holding that a party who
misapplies these trust funds is subject to civil penalty if the duty is
breached under the Act and the plaintiffs are within the class of people
the Act was designed to protect. The appellate court reviewed Hol-
laday's various affirmative defenses under the Texas Construction Fund
Act.271 In the subject case, Holladay contended he was retaining funds
267. Id. at § II, Form T-19.
268. Holladay v. CW&A, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 243 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet.
denied).
269. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.001 (Vernon 2003).
270. Lively v. Carpet Servs., Inc., 904 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1995, writ denied).
271. TEX. PROp. CODE ANN. §162.031(b) (Vernon 1995), provides that it is an affirma-
tive defense to prosecution for the withholding of trust funds if the trust funds "were used
by the trustee to pay the trustee's actual expenses directly related to the construction or
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for repair of faulty work and not to determine whether entitlement
thereto was authorized. CW&A alleged that Holladay failed to prove the
specific sums of money to repair the specific improvements. The court
dismissed the rigors of such proof holding that the statute does not re-
quire such explicit level of proof tying particular expenditures to the par-
ticular improvements. On the other hand, the appellate court remanded
for further consideration the subcontractor's assertion against the appli-
cability of such affirmative defense, based upon factual issues relating to
whether the subcontractor caused the problems necessitating the repairs,
whether the owner inspected and accepted the work and made payments
for same to the general contractor, and whether the subcontractor offered
to complete the job and perform repairs at its own expense.
The case of Dalton Contractors v. Bryan Autumn Woods2 72 involved an
action to compel arbitration filed by a contractor to enforce the contrac-
tor's lien regarding construction of an apartment complex. Dalton Con-
tractors, Inc., as the contractor, and Bryant Autumn Woods, Ltd.,
"Buddy" McGraw and Bill McGraw, contracted for the construction of
an apartment complex. After a payment dispute, Dalton filed a lien. The
owners sued to remove the lien and for damages for breach of contract.
The construction contract contained an arbitration clause. The appellate
court examined whether the trial court erred by denying Dalton's motion
to compel arbitration. The analysis focused on whether a valid arbitra-
tion agreement existed and whether the claims fell within the scope of the
parties' agreement. The court found that, where the validity of a contrac-
tor's lien arises out of or relates to a construction contract, the claim will
be subject to arbitration under the contract. Thus, the case was re-
manded with instructions for the trial court to enter an order compelling
arbitration.
In Lee Lewis Construction v. Harrison,273 the Harrison family brought
a wrongful death lawsuit against Lee Lewis Construction when Jimmy
Harrison, who was an employee of a glass subcontractor and who was not
using adequate fall protection devices, died after falling from the tenth
floor of a construction site. Testimony revealed that the contractor as-
signed its job superintendent "the responsibility to routinely inspect the
ninth and tenth floor addition to the south tower to see to it that the
subcontractors and their employees properly utilized fall protection
equipment. '274 Furthermore, the general contractor's superintendent
personally approved the specific fall protection system being utilized by
the glass subcontractor. This retention of the right to control fall protec-
tion systems on the jobsite created the general contractor's duty of care
repair of the improvement or have been retained by the trustee, after notice to the benefi-
ciary, who has made a request for payment, as a result of the trustee's reasonable belief
that the beneficiary is not entitled to such funds . .. ."
272. Dalton Contractors v. Bryan Autumn Woods, Ltd., 60 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
273. Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778 (Tex. 2001).
274. Id. at 784.
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to the worker. Because of the actual retention of such responsibility, the
court did not believe it was necessary to address whether the contractor
contractually retained the right to control fall protection systems.
In Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission v. IT-Davy,2 75 the
Supreme Court of Texas examined whether the sovereign-immunity doc-
trine prevented IT-Davy, the general contractor doing the clean-up work
on the Sikes Disposal Pits in Houston, from suing the TNRCC for breach
of contract. The contract provided a fixed price for clean-up but with an
adjusted consideration if the clean-up necessitated either an unexpectedly
greater or lesser effort on behalf of the contractor. When the contractor
alleged that conditions materially differed and suggested an additional
$6,723,655 in extra costs, the TNRCC refused to pay such amount. The
contractor sought to arbitrate the dispute as required in the contract's
remedies provision, but TNRCC further denied this request. The con-
tractor brought suit, and TNRCC filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on
sovereign immunity. IT-Davy offered four exceptions to the sovereign
immunity doctrine: waiver by conduct, waiver by contract, waiver by leg-
islative consent pursuant to the Texas Water Code, and waiver under the
Declaratory Judgment Act. Justice Baker, on behalf of the majority, con-
cluded that waiver of the sovereign immunity was not available under any
of those theories. As for waiver by conduct, IT-Davy asserted that it fully
performed under the contract, did additional work at the TNRCC's ex-
press request, and was refused full payment from the TNRCC for such
work. The majority of the Texas Supreme Court refused to consider such
actions a waiver of sovereign immunity. The court held firm to its general
rule that waiver of sovereign immunity is within the legislature's sole
province, and can only be accomplished with a clear expression of such
waiver.2 76 The court referred to a footnote in Federal Sign v. Texas
Southern University, 951 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. 1997) wherein the court opined
that "the State may waive its immunity by conduct other than simply exe-
cuting the contract. ... "277 Nevertheless, the language of the majority in
IT-Davy refused to recognize any such exception as being legitimate.
The court concluded that to allow "governmental entities to waive immu-
nity by conduct that includes accepting benefits under a contract would
be fundamentally inconsistent with our established jurisprudence and
with the existing legislative scheme. '278 The court also rejected the
waiver by contract claim asserted by IT-Davy, even though the contract
specifically provided arbitration as a remedy in the event of a breach
thereof. The court's position was that administrative agencies that cannot
waive immunity from suit cannot accomplish such a waiver by contracting
for a specific remedy provision. This is true notwithstanding that such
administrative agencies have the right to contract, even though Texas
275. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002).
276. Id. at 857. See TEx. GoV'T CODE ANN. § 311.034 (Vernon 2003); Univ. of Tex.
Med. Branch at Galveston v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. 1994).
277. Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 408 n.1 (Tex. 1997).
278. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 857.
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Water Code section 5.229 allows the TNRCC's executive director the
right to negotiate and execute contracts to carry out the powers, duties,
and responsibilities of the agency. This provision does not provide the
clear and unambiguous waiver necessary for the TNRCC to waive immu-
nity from breach of contract. Turning to the alleged waiver in the Texas
Water Code, the court concluded that the Texas Water Code did not pro-
vide a waiver of sovereign immunity for breach of contract suits, but that
the applicable provisions thereof279 related only to rights to bring actions
for review of administrative actions of a regulatory nature. The contrac-
tor also alleged a waiver under the Declaratory Judgment Act, which the
Court summarily dismissed on a similar basis to that of the alleged Texas
Water Code waiver.
Notwithstanding the result in IT-Davy, Justice Hecht, joined by Chief
Justice Phillips, Justice Owen and Justice Jefferson, presented a concur-
ring opinion, and Justice Enoch issued a dissenting opinion. Justice
Hecht and the other concurring justices took issue with the majority's
opinion, which seemingly slammed the door on any possible waiver by
conduct, pointing out the long held waiver of immunity by the State's
action of filing a lawsuit.280 However, Justice Enoch, in dissenting, claims
both the majority and concurring opinion force contractors who have
been wrongfully treated by the State to resort to the courts looking for
the "magic key that will loosen sovereign immunity's lock and open the
courthouse doors."'28' The conclusions that seem inevitable from this
case, considering the concurring and dissenting opinions, are that parties
must contract with the State at their own risk and that clear contractual
provisions will not carry the day. Such parties may be forced to wander
the courthouse halls searching for the magic key of waiver as implied in
the concurring opinion and forceably asserted in the dissenting opinion.
In another waiver of sovereign immunity case, Travis County v. Pelzel
& Associates, Inc.,282 Pelzel & Associates, Inc. sued Travis County, alleg-
ing breach of contract for the improper withholding of payment under a
construction contract. According to the contract's liquidated damages
clause, Travis County could retain $250 for each calendar day Pelzel
failed to substantially complete the building beyond the date set for com-
pletion and acceptance. Travis County withheld under the liquidated
damages clause only $5,500 of the total contract price of $414,164.80. The
Texas Supreme Court concluded that Travis County did not waive immu-
nity from suit by invoking the contract's liquidated damages clause even
if the propriety of that adjustment is disputed.
In Raymond v. Rahme,283 a concrete subcontractor, Raymond, sued
Rahme, the property owner, over a mechanic's lien filed after a dispute
279. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 5.351 and 5.352 allow suits by persons "affected by a
[TNRCC] ruling, order, decision, or other act".
280. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 861 and cases cited therein.
281. Id. at 863.
282. Travis County v. Pelzel & Assocs., Inc., 77 S.W.3d 246 (Tex. 2002).
283. Raymond v. Rahme, 78 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).
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arose on construction projects to build gas stations on Rahme's proper-
ties. Rahme was not satisfied with the thickness of the concrete or the
construction techniques used to support and reinforce the concrete.
When the subcontractor was not paid on the work that started in Septem-
ber 1996 and ended in November 1996, the subcontractor wrote the
owner a letter dated February 5, 1997 stating the amount the subcontrac-
tor was owed. Although an initial mechanic's lien affidavit was com-
pleted and signed on February 8, 1997, it was not filed, and a second
mechanic's lien affidavit was signed and filed on April 4, 1997, with a
copy being sent to the owner and general contractor with a demand for
payment. While the Texas Property Code grants a subcontractor lien
rights, such lien must be perfected in substantial compliance with the ap-
plicable statutory provisions.284 Furthermore, the subcontractor must file
the lien affidavit with the applicable county clerk no later than the fif-
teenth day of the fourth calendar month following the day on which the
indebtedness accrued.285 Because the debt accrued on November 30,
1996, the lien affidavit had to have been filed by March 15, 1997; there-
fore, the April 4, 1997 filing was not timely and, hence, was invalid. 286
Additionally, the court held that the notice letter to the owner was insuf-
ficient to meet the specific requirements of the statutory notice. The sub-
ject letter only indicated the amount unpaid and owing to the
subcontractor and in the reference line reflected an intent to file a lien
against the property. The court determined that this did not provide the
necessary notice that the owner could be subjected to personal liability if
funds were not appropriately withheld from the general contractor as re-
quired by the statutory retainage requirements.
XVII. CONDEMNATION
The most significant condemnation issue addressed during the survey
year was in Interstate Northborough Partnership v. State.287 The matter
arose when the State pursued a condemnation suit to acquire .365 acres
of INP's property as part of a project to widen 1-45. Notably, the con-
demnation caused existing structures on INP's property to be much closer
to the frontage road and expanded highway, and left the structures in
violation of building setback ordinances and deed restrictions. The pri-
284. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.051 (Vernon 1995). The statutory lien right re-
quires a subcontractor to give the property owner notice of the debt no later than the
fifteenth day of the third month following each month in which the subcontractor worked
or provided materials. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.056(b) (Vernon 1995).
285. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.052(a) (Vernon 1995). TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 53.053(c) (Vernon 1995) provides that indebtedness to a subcontractor accrues on the last
day of the last month in which labor was performed or materials furnished.
286. Raymond alleged a later deadline under TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.053(e)
(Vernon 1995), which allows the determination of the accrual of a claim to be the last day
of the month when all work under the contract is completed; however, that section ad-
dresses only statutory retainage and not contractual retainage; consequently, it was held to
be inapplicable to the subject claim. Raymond, 78 S.W.3d at 560 n.2.
287. Interstate Northborough P'ship v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. 2001).
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mary issues addressed by the court were whether INP could recover dam-
ages for the increased proximity to the expanded highway, and whether
those damages were special in nature. In a matter of first impression, the
court held that increased proximity damages were attributable to the
State's use of the condemned land, and the impact upon INP's property
was unique such that they were special damages and not damages suf-
fered by the community at large. The Texas Supreme Court relied heav-
ily upon the fact that the highway relocation caused the existing buildings
to violate city setback ordinances and deed restrictions, and further, that
evidence revealed that the close proximity of the highway caused signifi-
cant damage to the existing use of the property.
In another condemnation matter, Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority v.
Kraft,288 the Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower court's opinion and
found that an expert appraiser's testimony on value should have been
excluded. While the court noted that the comparable sales approach is a
generally accepted appraisal technique, the expert appraiser's bald assur-
ance that he was using a widely accepted approach was not sufficient to
demonstrate that his opinion was reliable. Upon closer review of the ex-
pert's underlying data, it was revealed that the comparable sales he used
were not comparable to the condemned property; therefore, the expert
opinion was unreliable and inadmissible. The Houston Court of Appeals
also found expert opinion testimony to be unreliable in Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co. v. Radler Pavilion Limited Partnership.289 The property
owner's expert provided an opinion of value based upon what he believed
to be a reasonably probable use of the property in the immediate future.
The court disagreed, and found that the conceptual redevelopment con-
sidered by the appraiser was purely speculative and not the type of testi-
mony admissible in a condemnation proceeding.
A number of cases touched upon the recovery of lost profits in con-
demnation proceedings. In State v. Whataburger,290 the court considered
the appropriateness of the award of lost profits arising from the State's
denial of access to a business. In Whataburger, the court noted an impor-
tant distinction between utilizing a comparable sales approach and a cost
approach when determining the value of property in condemnation suits.
Whenever the replacement cost method is utilized, lost profits are not
considered, and therefore must be added to the award to adequately
compensate a property owner. In Whataburger, the property owner was
entitled to compensation because the building had to be razed and built
in a different location on the tract due to the condemnation. Because the
subject building was of a unique character, the replacement cost method
of appraisal was appropriate. As such, Whataburger was entitled not
288. Guadalupe-Blanco River Auth. v. Kraft, 77 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. 2002).
289. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Radler Pavilion Ltd. P'ship, 77 S.W.3d 482 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).




only to the statutory condemnation award, but a separate award for lost
profits.
In State v. Dick,291 lost profits were held appropriate for the temporary
impairment of access to the remainder tract. The court held that in addi-
tion to a statutory award for the physical property taken, the property
owner was entitled to lost profits arising from the denial of access to a
remainder tract, which he had operated as a used car lot. Further, in
Pinnacle Gas Treating, Inc. v. Read,292 an award of lost profits was af-
firmed at the appellate level when a planned chicken farm was delayed by
the condemnation. Even though lost profits are generally not recover-
able for speculative businesses, the court found that the property owners
had presented sufficient evidence regarding the lost profits for the time
period of the temporary construction easement. However, the Texas Su-
preme Court in a recent decision reversed the damages award and re-
manded the case for a decision on whether a first condemnation should
have been dismissed.293
In The City of Houston v. Precast Structures, Inc.,294 the court affirmed
an award of damages to a property owner occasioned by a loss of access
after the condemnation. In Precast, it was noted that the subject condem-
nation eliminated a preexisting access point for the property owner's bus-
iness. After condemnation, the business would have to reconfigure its
access to the property. The court held that impairment of a property
owner's access rights constituted a compensable damage, and the prop-
erty owner had proven damages by showing the amount necessary to re-
store the property to pre-condemnation conditions.
Several cases addressed the requirement of a bona fide pre-condemna-
tion offer by the condemning authority as a jurisdictional prerequisite to
condemnation. In ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v Bell,295 a condemning au-
thority was not limited to negotiating for only a condemned property dur-
ing its required good faith negotiations. It could also discuss negotiations
for offers to buy more than the property it condemns. However, in
MidTexas Pipeline Co. v. Dernehl,296 the condemning authority failed to
show that it had made the required offer of settlement, since its negotia-
tions had included an offer to purchase rights which were not subject to
condemnation. There was no evidence that the condemning authority
ever made an offer that comprehended only the rights it sought in con-
demnation. Further, the evidence supported the trial court's finding that
291. State v. Dick, 69 S.W.3d 612 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2001, no pet.).
292. Pinnacle Gas Treating, Inc. v. Read, 69 S.W.3d 240 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002), rev'd
and remanded, 46 TEX. Sup. C. J. 599, 2003 WL 1889476 (Apr. 17, 2003).
293. Pinnacle Gas Treating, Inc. v. Read, 46 TEX. Sup. C. J. 594, 2003 WL 1889476
(Apr. 17, 2003).
294. City of Houston v. Precast Structures, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 331 (Tex. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
295. ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Bell, 84 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2002, pet. filed).




further negotiations would not have been futile. In McKinney Indepen-
dent School District v. Carlisle Grace, Ltd.,297 the fact that a second offer
of compensation was made after the landowners rejected the first propo-
sal was not evidence that the first offer was not made in good faith. Fur-
ther, the court noted that the landowners desire to continue negotiations
was not relevant to the issue of whether the condemnor had made a bona
fide good faith offer as required prior to initiating condemnation
proceedings.
Finally, in State v. Bristol Hotel Asset Co.,2 98 the Texas Supreme Court
ruled that a return of service filed with the Special Commissioners in an
administrative condemnation proceeding may be used as evidence of
proper service. While the lower court found that the executed return of
service was inadmissible hearsay, the Texas Supreme Court held that the
return of service in the administrative proceeding should be treated like
those in judicial proceedings and that it was prima facie evidence of
service.
XVIII. AD VALOREM TAXATION
Dallas Central Appraisal District v Wang2 99 illustrates the impact that
an erroneous private tax certificate can have on a purchaser of property.
As purchasers, the Wangs obtained property that, unbeknownst to them,
had previously been erroneously granted over-65 homestead exemption
status. After the Wangs' purchase, the appraisal district discovered the
improperly granted exemption and delivered the Wangs a statement for
five years of back taxes, penalties, and interest.300 While noting that this
back-appraisal statute had questionable due process protections for pur-
chasers such as the Wangs, the court upheld the mandatory back assess-
ment. The purchasers were charged with the responsibility of
investigating possible prior erroneously granted exemptions. Of impor-
tance, the court noted that the Wangs had obtained a tax certificate from
a private company that indicated that the property was free from any
outstanding taxes, but that certificate did not have the same effect as a tax
certificate purchased from a taxing entity. If the title company had ob-
tained a clear tax certificate from the relevant taxing entities, the Wangs
would have been absolved of any liability for the erroneous
exemptions. 30 1
There is an apparent conflict between opinions recently issued by the
Travis and Austin Courts of Appeals on the issue of valuing property
owned by a governmental entity but not used for public purposes. In
297. McKinney Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Carlisle Grace, Ltd., 83 S.W.3d 205 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2002, no pet.).
298. State v. Bristol Hotel Asset Co., 65 S.W.3d 638 (Tex. 2002).
299. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Wang, 82 S.W.3d 697 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet.
filed).
300. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.43(i) (Vernon 2002).
301. Id. § 31.08(b).
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Gables Realty Limited Partnership v. Travis Central Appraisal District,30 2
the Austin Court held that state-owned property subject to a long term
lease for a private commercial purpose was not tax-exempt public prop-
erty. While the Texas Tax Code does allow for taxation of a private lease-
hold interest if the underlying property is exempt public property, the
Gables court noted that in the event that the underlying fee itself is no
longer used for a public purpose, then the leasehold is subsumed in the
fee estate and the entire property is taxable. Importantly, the Austin
Court noted that the activities of the private lessee must be viewed when
determining whether the underlying state-owned fee is eligible for
exemption.30
3
In Panola County Appraisal District v. Panola County Fresh Water Sup-
ply District No. 1,304 decided four months prior to issuance of the Gables
opinion, the Texarkana Court of Appeals applied taxation principles to
lakefront lots owned by a fresh water supply district, which were leased to
individuals for terms between one and ninety-nine years. While the hold-
ing centered upon the standing of the water district to challenge the val-
ues attributed to the leasehold interests, the opinion clearly indicates that
the underlying fee was tax exempt as public property and that only the
leaseholds were subject to taxation. While the issue of the exempt status
of the underlying fee was not squarely before the court, the court's ratio-
nale and ruling implicitly approved of the exemption of the water dis-
trict's property even though it was clearly not being used for a public
purpose. Based on a plain reading of the Texas Tax Code, which autho-
rizes the public property exemption "if the property is used for public
purposes" it is likely that the issue of the taxation of public property that
is leased to private entities will be resolved in line with the Gables
opinion.305
While only remotely related to real estate, the Zapata County Ap-
praisal District v. Coastal Oil and Gas30 6 case is worth note, as it estab-
lished a mineral valuation that dramatically favored the property owner.
In Coastal, the court agreed with the property owner that the taxable
value of oil and gas should be based an the market or spot price and not
on the contract price of the minerals. Thus, the taxpayer was entitled to a
value that was a quarter of that proposed by the appraisal district. Fi-
nally, the Houston Court of Appeals affirmed its previous holding on uni-
form and equal valuation challenges in Weingarten Realty Investors v.
302. Gables Realty Ltd. P'ship v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 81 S.W.3d 869 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied).
303. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.11(a) (Vernon 2001).
304. Panola County Appraisal Dist. v. Panola County Fresh Water Supply Dist., No. 1,
69 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.).
305. See also Wackenhut Corrections Corp. v. Bexar Appraisal Dist., No. 04-02-00365-
CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio July 31, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002
WL 31662756 (upholding taxation of leasehold interest attributable to lease of former jail,
but failing to address the issue of taxation of underlying fee owned by county).
306. Zapata County Appraisal Dist. v. Coastal Oil & Gas, 90 S.W.3d 847 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
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Harris County Appraisal District.30 7 While the court severely criticized
the techniques used by the appraiser, it confirmed that taxpayers are enti-
tled to relief if they can show that other similarly situated properties are
being valued on a more favorable basis for tax purposes. In this type of
challenge, the actual market value of the property is not relevant.
XIX. ENTITIES
In Texas Westheimer Corp. v. 5647 Westheimer Associates,30 8 a partner-
ship sued the management company of the partnership's adult nightclub
for fraud and breach of contract during the winding up of the partnership
and after the corporate charters of the partner entities had been forfeited.
Three individuals originally formed corporations to act as the only three
partners of 5647 Westheimer Associates, the nightclub owners. After
months of operating deficits at the nightclub, 5647 Westheimer Associates
agreed to sell the club to Texas Westheimer Corporation, but the partner-
ship retained the right to participate in profits from the club's operation.
After several months of operation and several name changes at the club,
the partnership raised questions about the accounting by the manage-
ment company, which was operated by Texas Westheimer Corporation.
Eventually, the partnership filed suit and the trial court found that, inter
alia, Texas Westheimer Corporation had mismanaged the accounting and
committed fraud, the court awarded the partnership $464,000 for its
losses and $600,000 in exemplary damages. The defendant appealed the
judgment.
The corporation argued that the partnership had no standing to bring
suit because two of three corporations comprising the partnership had
forfeited their rights to do business, and the third corporation was not
duly registered as a foreign corporation in Texas. The basic tenet of law
that the court relied to refute this argument is that a partnership is "an
entity legally distinct from its partners. '30 9 The court stated that even if
all of the corporate partners had forfeited their charter prior to the law-
suit, the partnership may have been dissolved, as a matter of fact, but that
it continued to exist during its winding up period "until all preexisting
matters were terminated. '310 As a result, the institution of the lawsuit
was a part of the winding up process and was instituted properly.
Texas Westheimer Corporation's next point of appeal was that the
judgment against it is incorrect as it does not factor in the losses that the
nightclub suffered, for which the partnership allegedly obligated itself to
share. The court noted, however, that the profit participation agreement
307. Weingarten Realty Investors v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 93 S.W.3d 280 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
308. Tex. Westheimer Corp v. 5647 Westheimer Assocs., 68 S.W.3d 15 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
309. Id. at 21.
310. Id. at 22.
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was an agreement to participate in the profits only. The agreement con-
tained no provision for loss sharing. As such, the judgment was correct.
In a case involving a worker's compensation claim for the injury of a
sheetrock employee, the San Antonio Court of Appeals in Ingalls v. Stan-
dard Gypsum, L.L.C.,311 held that a member of a limited liability com-
pany employer that also acts as the employer of the injured worker may
not be sued as a third party when a claim is made under the Texas
Worker's Compensation Act. In this particular case, one of the members
of the employer limited liability company was the manager of the gypsum
plant in which the injury occurred.
The court pointed to section 408.011(a) of the Texas Labor Code,
which states that "recovery of workers' compensation benefits is the ex-
clusive remedy of an employee covered by workers' compensation insur-
ance ... against the employer or an agent or employee of the employer
for. .. a work related injury. ' 312 While an employee may not sue his em-
ployer for such injuries, the employee may sue a third party for damages
incurred as a result of the injury. 313 The injured employee sued, among
others, the manager of the limited liability company employer as a third
party.
Because Temple-Inland, the manager of the plant, had the right to con-
trol the details of the injured employee's work, it argued that it should be
considered a joint employer, rather than a third party. The court ac-
knowledged that the Texas Supreme Court has recognized the joint em-
ployment doctrine in workers' compensation cases. 314 As an alternative
ground for affirmance of the trial court's finding that the workers' com-
pensation claim was the only allowable claim, Temple-Inland and the
other members of Standard Gypsum, L.L.C. argued that by the very na-
ture of their being members of Standard Gypsum, L.L.C., they should as
a matter of law be considered employers of the limited liability com-
pany's employees. 315
The court noted that this alternative claim was a matter of first impres-
sion for the court. In the end, however, the court granted immunity to
Temple-Inland under the Workers' Compensation Act on the basis of it
acting as the manager of the gypsum plant. The court, however, re-
manded to the trial court for further findings the issue of whether the
limited liability company's other member enjoys immunity solely as a re-
sult of its being a member of the company.
The trial court in Williams v. Adams, 31 6 held the officers of a corpora-
311. Ingalls v. Standard Gypsum, L.L.C., 70 S.W.3d 252 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002,
pet. denied).
312. Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 256.
315. Id. at 258 (citing Lawler v. Dallas Statler-Hilton Joint Venture, 793 S.W.2d 27 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied), Sims v. Western Waste Indus., 918 S.W.2d 682 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1996, writ denied), and Alice Leasing Corp. v. Castillo, 53 S.W.3d 433
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet denied)).
316. Williams v. Adams, 74 S.W.3d 437 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied).
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tion personally liable for a tort judgment against the corporation itself.
The plaintiff was injured at a condominium project on South Padre Island
and won a $987,000 judgment against Williams Construction Co., the
builder of the project. Before collecting on the judgment, however, the
corporation's charter was forfeited for failure to pay its franchise taxes.
The plaintiff brought another suit against the two officers of the corpora-
tion seeking to hold them personally liable for the judgment.
The trial court incorrectly likened the tort judgment to franchise taxes
and, citing section 171.255 of the Texas Tax Code, held the officers per-
sonally liable. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment in a
matter of first impression by holding that such statute does not apply to
unintentional torts and that officers of corporations whose charters are
forfeited for failure to pay franchise taxes are not liable for a judgment
against the corporation stemming from an unintentional tort. The court
distinguished between these debts of a corporation that the officers
would be deemed to have knowledge and control and those debts that are
not within the control of the officers, such as tort judgments. The intent
of the statute, when strictly construed, is to prevent the officers from
"lay[ing] behind the log" and allowing them immunity from personal lia-
bility if such would be a perversion of the corporate existence.317 The
court reasoned that section 171.255 of the Texas Tax Code cannot reason-
ably be used to "impute personal liability to an officer or director of a
corporation for corporate debt when the 'debt' at issue is a tort judgment
based on negligence liability. '318
While the holdings of the appeals court in Landon v. S&H Marketing
Group, Inc.319 will not be considered a watershed case in corporate law, it
may be horn book material for Texas corporation law. Based upon myr-
iad fraudulent actions of a president of affiliated corporations, the ap-
peals court was presented with fodder for reciting the following "rules"
suitable for citation in any law student's business enterprises class: of-
ficers and directors owe the strictest fiduciary duty to their corporation;
such fiduciary duties of officers and directors include the duties of obedi-
ence, loyalty, and due care; 320 the duty of loyalty requires an officer to act
in good faith putting the interest of the corporation above the interest of
the officer; contracts between a corporation and its officers are voidable
for unfairness and fraud; and a corporate fiduciary is under an obligation
not to usurp corporate opportunities for personal gain. 321
XX. INDEMNITIES
In Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal District v. Board of Trustees of the
317. Id. at 441.
318. Id. at 442.
319. Landon v. S&H Mktg. Group, Inc., 82 S.W.3d 666 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, no
pet.).
320. Id. at 672 (citing Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 709 (5th
Cir. 1984)).
321. Id. at 672-73, 681-82.
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Galveston Wharves,3 2 2 the parties entered into an access agreement for
the storage of cranes. The cranes were damaged due to rodent infesta-
tion. The access agreement contained an indemnity by the property
owner in favor of the owner of the cranes for damages resulting from any
misrepresentation or breach of warranty. The court narrowly construed
this indemnity and held that because there was no representation or war-
ranty regarding the condition of the premises, the indemnity did not pro-
vide protection for the owner of the cranes.
In Estate of Frank M. Montague, Jr. v. National Loan Investors, L.P. ,323
the holder of a note sued for collection and additionally claimed attor-
ney's fees pursuant to a provision in the note that provided for "ten per-
cent (10%) additional on the amount of principal and interest then
owing, as attorney's fees. '324 The San Antonio Court of Appeals stated
that "the Texas Supreme Court noted, 'Texas courts do not regard agree-
ments to pay attorney's fees based on a percentage of the unpaid balance
and interest of a promissory note as absolute promises to pay the contrac-
tual amount, but as contracts to indemnify the holder of the note for at-
torney's fees actually incurred in collecting the principal and interest of
the note." 325 The court in Montague held that the provision providing
for payment of attorney's fees was an indemnity, that the obligor may
challenge the reasonableness of attorney's fees despite the contractual
provision, and the holder is also able to prove that reasonable attorney's
fees exceed the contractual percentage.
XXI. MISCELLANEOUS
A. ARBITRATION
Dalton Contractors, Inc. v. Bryan Autumn Woods, Ltd.326 involved a
contract relating to the construction of an apartment complex that con-
tained an arbitration clause. A payment dispute arose and the contractor
filed a lien on the property. The property owner asserted that the validity
of the lien should be resolved pursuant to section 53.106(e) of the Texas
Property Code rather than the arbitration clause. The appellate court
held that "there is nothing [in the Texas Property Code] to indicate that
the issue may not also be resolved by [arbitration]. '327 The court also
held that arbitration must be compelled if there is a valid, enforceable
arbitration agreement, and the claims asserted fall within the scope of the
322. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Bd. of Trustees of the Galveston
Wharves, 62 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
323. Estate of Montague v. Nat'l Loan Investors, 70 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2001, pet. denied).
324. Id. at 250.
325. Id. (citing F.R. Hernandez Const. & Supply Co. v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 578
S.W.2d 675, 676 (Tex. 1979)).
326. Dalton Contractors, Inc. v. Bryan Autumn Woods, Ltd., 60 S.W.3d 351 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).





In Aghili v. Banks,329 owners of condominium units brought an action
against the condominium owners' association, its management company,
the foreclosure sale buyer and the attorney who conducted the foreclo-
sure sale seeking to set aside the non-judicial foreclosure of their units.
The trial court granted summary judgment against the condominium
owners. The condominium owners appealed claiming the summary judg-
ment was inappropriate since it was based on an affidavit of John Banks,
the attorney who conducted the foreclosure sale, was named as a defen-
dant in the lawsuit by the condominium owners, and represented all de-
fendants, including himself, in the lawsuit. The condominium owners
objected to the appearance of Banks as the primary witness for the defen-
dant's joint motion for summary judgment. Rule 3.08 of the Texas Disci-
plinary Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits an attorney from
appearing both as a witness and as counsel unless certain exceptions are
met. When an attorney who represents a party is an affiant in support of
a motion for summary judgment, he or she is a witness. 330 The court held
that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Banks to appear
as both a witness and counsel in this case, and reversed and remanded the
defendant's motion for summary judgment to the trial court for further
proceedings.
In re Roseland Oil & Gas, Inc.331 involved an attorney who represented
all defendants in a lawsuit concerning an oil and gas lease and later with-
drew from representation of one of the defendants. The plaintiff filed a
motion to disqualify the attorney from representing the remaining de-
fendants. The trial court denied the motion and the plaintiff sought a writ
of mandamus. Rule 1.09 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct provides in relevant part:
[w]ithout prior consent, a lawyer who personally has formerly repre-
sented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another per-
son in a matter adverse to the former client . . . (2) if the
representation in reasonable probability vill involve a violation of
Rule 1.05; or (3) if it is the same or a substantially related matter.332
Rule 1.05 provides that it is impermissible for an attorney to "knowingly
... [u]se confidential information of a former client to the disadvantage
of the former client after the representation is concluded" or "[u]se privi-
328. Id. (citing Hearthshire Braeswood Plaza Ltd. P'ship v. Bill Kelly Co., 849 S.W.2d
380 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied)).
329. Aghili v. Banks, 63 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet.
denied).
330. Id. at 817 (citing Mauze v. Curry, 861 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. 1993)).
331. In re Roseland Oil & Gas, Inc., 68 S.W.3d 784 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, no
pet.).
332. Id. at 786-87.
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leged information of the client for the advantage of [another]. ' 333 The
court held that the attorney's continued representation of the remaining
defendants was adverse since there was "a small, yet serious risk" of ad-
versity, 334 and such representation violated Rule 1.09.
C. MINERALS
A case of first impression for the construction of a Granite Deed was
presented in Wilderness Cove, Ltd. v. Cold Spring Granite Co. 335 This
case arose from an 1890 grant by three of five cotenants in a 300 acre
tract in Burnet County. The grant related to Texas red granite that was to
be used to build the then new state capital building in Austin. The con-
sideration for the granite was particularly high at that time considering
the need for such red granite in the construction of the state capital build-
ing with a fair market value between $100,000 and $200,000, or between
$15 and $30 per acre. Quarrying of the granite never occurred, Wilder-
ness Cover acquired title of the entire surface estate to the 300 acres and
one-half undivided interest in the granite. The remaining one-half inter-
est in the granite was held by Cold Spring. When Wilderness Cove began
to develop 30 acres of the property for residential and recreational use,
Cold Spring sought a restraining order to prohibit drilling holes or placing
explosive charges in the granite. Litigation ensued and the appellate
court was faced with interpretation of the meaning of the Granite Deed.
The first issue was whether the Granite Deed granted a severable min-
eral estate of the granite in situ. While the court had to ascertain the
intent of the parties, the ultimate question was whether granite could be
regarded as a mineral for purposes of establishing a severable mineral
estate. The court reviewed two lines of cases, one that granted or re-
served minerals without specifying the exact mineral. The other line of
cases granted or reserved a specific mineral substance. Under the generic
grant or reservation line of cases, the court concluded that commercial
value of the mineral or substance being discussed was a critical element in
determining whether it represented a severable mineral estate or whether
title resided with the surface estate owner.336 The court cited Schwarz v.
State,337 in which the Texas legislature reserved coal and lignite under
property when the surface estate was deeded away. The Schwarz court
recognized that the presumed intent announced in earlier cases did not
apply because they were rules for construing ambiguous and generic con-
333. Id. at 787 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
334. Id. at 787 (citing Nat'l Med. Enters., Inc. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 123, 132 (Tex.
1996)).
335. Wilderness Cove, Ltd. v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 62 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2001, no pet.).
336. See Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984) (relating to reservations
of "other minerals" in the context of uranimum ore); Heinatz v. Allen, 217 S.W.2d 994
(Tex. 1949) (dealing with a devise by will of "mineral rights" where a dispute arose as to
the ability to quarry limestone); Hendler v. LeHigh Valley R.R. Co., 58 A. 486, 487 (Pa.
1904) (dealing with granite, limestone or other building material).
337. Schwarz v. State, 703 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1986).
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veyances. Consequently, the court, recognizing Texas' adherence to the
ownership in place doctrine, announced that the Granite Deed conveyed
the in situ granite deposit as a severable mineral estate. Furthermore, the
court concluded that as a mineral estate, it would be the dominant estate
taking priority over the surface usage. The court rejected a contingent
that the conveyance of an undivided interest in the granite somehow
changed the character of the mineral estate as being dominant.
D. LETTERS OF CREDIT
In Synergy Center, Ltd. v. Lone Star Franchising, Inc. ,338 a commercial
tenant brought an action against its landlord seeking a temporary injunc-
tion to stop the landlord from presenting a letter of credit held as security
for the tenant's obligations under the lease. The letter of credit was held
to be a separate contract between the bank and the beneficiary indepen-
dent of the underlying obligations.339 The Texas Supreme Court has held
that presentment of a letter of credit may not be enjoined unless there is
evidence of fraud by the beneficiary. 340 The court in Synergy held that
there was no evidence of fraud and, therefore, no justification for a tem-
porary injunction preventing the landlord from presenting the letter of
credit.
E. Lis PENDENS
In the In re Wolf, case 341 Strategic Finance, Inc. purchased accounts
receivable from First National Net, Inc. ("FNN"). Strategic alleged that
FNN improperly diverted proceeds collected by FNN on receivables pur-
chased by Strategic and that FNN used such diverted proceeds to
purchase certain real property. Strategic filed a lis pendens on the real
property. On appeal, the court stated that an adequate nexus must exist
between a claim and a subject property.342 The court held that use of the
proceeds to purchase the real property did not constitute such adequate
nexus and held that the trial court should grant the motion for an order
canceling the lis pendens.
F. ANNEXATION
Sunchase Capital Group, Inc. v. City of Crandal1343 involved a chal-
lenge to the City's annexation ordinances. The developer, Sunchase,
planned to develop property in rural Kaufman County as a residential
338. Synergy Ctr., Ltd. v. Lone Star Franchising, Inc., 63 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. App.-Aus-
tin 2001, no pet.).
339. Id. at 565 (citing Philipp Bros., Inc. v. Oil Country Specialists, Ltd., 787 S.W.2d 38,
40 (Tex. 1990)).
340. Id.
341. In re Wolf, 65 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, no pet.).
342. Id. at 806 (citing Olbrich v. Touchy, 780 S.W.2d 6, 7 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1989, no writ).




subdivision in accordance with the county's subdivision requirements. In
preparation for such development, Sunchase purchased water pipe and
incurred expenses for engineering services. Sunchase and other land
owners petitioned the county judge to incorporate the town of Quail
Country, which would include Sunchase's land. Subsequently, the City of
Crandall passed three annexation ordinances that made Sunchase's land
subject to the City's extraterritorial jurisdiction. Sunchase then sought a
declaratory judgment that the annexation ordinances were void. A pri-
vate party may only collaterally attack annexation ordinances as void
where the party is directly affected and suffers some burden peculiar to
himself.344 Sunchase was held not to have standing to challenge the an-
nexation ordinances as void because making Sunchase's property part of
the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the City of Crandall was not a burden
"any different, special or peculiar than those that ordinarily and indirectly
result from the City's exercise of its powers of annexation. '345
In City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne,346 the City of San Antonio
claimed that upon its application for annexation of land, it's extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction was automatically extended over such land. However,
the appellate court held that the extraterritorial jurisdiction of San
Antonio was not reestablished until the annexation occurred.
G. PREMISES LIABILITY
In Bill's Dollar Store, Inc. v. Bean,347 the court stated that the duty of
an owner or occupier of land to keep premises under his control in a safe
condition is discharged by (i) warning of unreasonable risks of harm ei-
ther known to the owner or which would be known to him by reasonable
inspection, or (ii) by making the premises reasonably safe. "[I]f the evi-
dence conclusively established that appellant adequately warned appellee
of the condition, appellant cannot be found negligent as a mater of
law. "348
The court held that a warning was adequate to discharge the owner's
duty if (i) an employee told a customer to watch for the wet spot as she
walked out the door, (ii) the employee pointed out the wet area, (iii)
other customers were able to avoid the wet area, (iv) the customer ac-
knowledged that the cashier pointed out the wet area, and (v) the cus-
tomer could see the floor was wet and knew that a freshly mopped floor
could be potentially a slipping hazard. The court noted the abolishment
of the no duty concept with regard to premises liability in Parker v. High-
344. Id. at 596 (citing City of West Lake Hills v. City of Austin, 466 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.
1971)).
345. Id. at 597.
346. City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 61 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2001, pet. granted).
347. Bill's Dollar Store, Inc. v. Bean, 77 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2002, pet. denied).
348. Id. at 369 (citing State v. Williams, 940 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Tex. 1996)).
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land Park, Inc.349 However, Parker did not change the underlying obliga-
tion to establish a duty or a violation of duty.350 In the dissenting
opinion, Senior Justice Wittig stated that this "is the first published Texas
case decided after adoption of comparative negligence to hold warning an
invitee of dangerous conditions may discharge premises liability as a mat-
ter of law."'35'
349. Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d'512 (Tex. 1978). Parker retained the
necessary elements of (1) establishment of a duty and (2) proof of a violation of that duty,
but abolished the additional element of proving the absence of the plaintiff's own subjec-
tive knowledge and appreciation of the danger.
350. Bills Dollar Store, 77 S.W.3d at 370 (citing Dixon v. Van Waters & Rogers, 682
S.W.2d 533, 534 (Tex. 1984) and Middleton v. Harris Press & Shear, Inc., 796 F.2d 747, 751
(5th Cir. 1986)).
351. Id. at 371.
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